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Within the United States, local jurisdictions have historically depended heavily 
upon the National Guard during major domestic incidents. Under Homeland Security 
guidelines, the Guard is still considered a primary responder when local resources are 
overwhelmed, but the reality is the Guard is not currently able to meet both its Homeland  
Defense and Homeland Security obligations. This thesis uses a realistic, worst-
case scenario to analyze and assess how existing limitations on Guard resources could 
impact critical incident response and recovery operations, and offers some 
recommendations for addressing the problems this void in anticipated resources may lead 
to. 
Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, a major 
shift in focus toward homeland security and domestic threats has occurred. Studies, 
policy statements and myriad miscellaneous documents have been distributed that outline 
perceived prevention and response requirements, particularly for large scale weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) attacks on U.S. soil.  
Many of these documents speak to the need to prepare and support first 
responders who will carry the brunt of responsibility for initial response and recovery. 
These same documents also point to the need to provide additional resources when major 
events, natural or manmade, overwhelm local jurisdictions. Responsibility for providing 
these resources has been shared among various federal agencies, including the Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) and its parent agency, the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS); however, practical responsibility for providing most 
manpower needs, including specially trained and equipped units, has fallen on the  
military through its role in support of civil authorities. During 2003, for example, the 
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latest year for which data is currently available, the Department of Defense responded to 
seventy-five separate requests for assistance.1
Dependence upon the military for civil support following a major incident follows 
a traditional path, but changing conditions may now make that path undependable. Given 
current and projected needs for military resources in support of its homeland defense role, 
factoring these same resources into security roles as well may be stretching the military 
beyond its current capabilities. Depending upon these resources may also create a 
tremendous backlash during and after an incident if the very resources depended upon are 
not available. 
What is the collective dependence of our communities on military resources 
during and immediately following major disasters? How dependable are those resources 
likely to be in the future? This paper focuses on these important questions, and presents 
some thoughts on how jurisdictions might face the loss of such a key resource. 
 
1 Paul McHale, “Address to the 108th Congress— Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional 
Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services” (Washington, D.C.: United States House of 
Representatives, March 4, 2004).  
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II. KEY TERMS 
One very real problem facing emergency planners is the lack of a universal set of 
terms. What is homeland security? Who should be considered a first responder? What is a 
weapon of mass destruction? Understanding what each of these key terms means is 
critical to understanding what this paper is trying to define. Therefore, a small number of 
the more important ones will be defined from the start. 
Homeland Security—The federal government officially defines homeland 
security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.”2 Within the federal government, though, there is a 
lack of strict adherence to this definition. The Department of Defense for example, 
includes both military support to civil authorities in response to terrorist events, and such 
support for other kinds of natural and manmade disasters as well.3
Even the Department of Homeland Security commingles terrorist and non-
terrorist events. Both their mission statement and set of strategic goals list a more generic 
meaning for the term than simply including acts of terrorism.4  
Because this paper discusses general response to various kinds of domestic 
incidents, the more inclusive definition shall be employed. Homeland security, therefore, 
refers to any kind of incident, natural or manmade, that threatens the safety of a 
community and its residents.  
Weapons of Mass Destruction—Weapons of mass destruction, or WMD, events 
are the focus of much discussion and concern over possible terrorist attacks, yet there 
continues to be significant confusion over what the term really means. 
                                                 
2 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C, Office of Homeland Security, July 
2002), 2. 
3 McHale, “Address to the 108th Congress— Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services.”   
4 Department of Homeland Security,  http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_homel.jsp [Accessed 
November 3, 2004]. 
 4 
WMD is an expression originally employed by the military to describe attacks 
using either chemical or biological agents or nuclear weapons. As concerns about the 
possible use of such weapons by terrorist groups began spreading, the term was picked up 
by non-military sectors as well, but the original military definition was retained. 
Several years ago, growing concerns about radiological disbursement devices 
(RDD’s) or “dirty bombs” lead to a distinction being drawn between a true nuclear device 
and one that uses conventional explosives to disburse radiological material. Thus the 
initial acronym, CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) was expanded to CBRN to 
include both kinds of devices.  
This definition remained in effect through 2003. As a consequence, both the 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City and the 9/11 attacks 
were initially not considered WMD events even though the amount of devastation and the 
number of casualties, especially in the latter attacks, was enormous.  
Beginning January 2005, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) modified 
the term WMD to include explosives (CBRNE). Although there are other definitions in 
use, including ones in the U.S. Code and Defense Department documents, this particular 
one is best suited to planning and response needs for local jurisdictions. Therefore, it will 
be used for this paper as well. A WMD event is one that uses any chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear or explosives device in a manner that does or could cause a 
significant number of casualties or damage.  
First/Emergency Responders—These terms have come to be used 
interchangeably, but the list of included disciplines differs somewhat among various 
jurisdictions. The Office for Domestic Preparedness includes ten different disciplines in 
this category:5
• Emergency Management 
• Law Enforcement 
• Emergency Medical Services  
                                                 
5 Office for Domestic Preparedness,  https://www.chds.us/public/spd.cfm?spi=app_odpprocess2 
[Accessed February 14, 2005]. 
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• Public Health   
• Fire  
• Public Safety Communications  
• Governmental Administration  
• Public Works  
• Hazardous Materials Personnel  
• Health Care 
Some states have augmented this list. In California, for instance, there are now a 
total of fourteen disciplines including the listed groups plus private security, cyberspace, 
agriculture and non-profit/not-for-profit organizations.6 For this paper, however, the term 
will be limited to the original ten groups. 
The terms I have elected to define, and the particular definitions presented, were 
selected to create a common basis for issues raised in this paper. They are by no means 
the only workable definitions available or key terms possible. What is imperative is 
getting beyond the confusion often found when employing terms using myriad 
definitions. That practice has forced a degree of confusion that is stalling our abilities to 
collectively address critical homeland security issues.  
 
 
6 LTC William A. Hipsley  (unpublished speech, Homeland Security Conference, Sacramento, CA, 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Based on a preliminary literature review, it became evident that little has been 
written that directly addresses the issues raised by this paper. Consequently, the research 
methods selected consisted of a two-prong approach.  
The first involved an extensive review of journals, periodicals and books for 
anecdotal information. With the assistance of Naval Postgraduate School librarians, a 
watch list of related topics was established. Through that list, and subsequent monitoring 
of articles and books, more than one hundred possible sources were identified and 
reviewed, leading to the references listed at the end of this paper. 
The second involved a series of interviews with subject matter experts in the areas 
of emergency planning, military operations (emphasis on logistics and military support to 
civil authority) and, eventually, to command level personnel from the National Guard.  
Interviews were conducted in person except for the majority of National Guard 
personnel who were interviewed via e-mail or telephone.  
Emergency planners were selected to represent small, medium and large 
jurisdictions, and all were selected because of their level of personal experience and 
established expertise. Military operations individuals were selected for their expertise in 
strategic military planning and resource utilization. National Guard personnel were 
selected on the recommendations of staff from the Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security, Monterey and the Defense Resource Management Institute, Monterey. 
Even though this area of research gives rise to substantial subjectivity, a decision 
was made to allow for free-form responses to a set of generic questions. Since the essence 
of the value placed upon subject matter experts depends upon their individual views, it 
was felt that any attempt to standardize those views would, in effect, eliminate the value 




• How important is military support to civil authority in response and 
recovery operations following major disasters (emergency planners)? 
• How much of this kind of support is relied upon during pre-event planning 
processes (emergency managers)? 
• What kinds of military support to civil authority are available (all)? 
• Are their alternate resources available if the military is unable or unwilling 
to provide requested resources (all)? 
• What are the factors currently, and in the foreseeable future, affecting the 
availability of military resources to support civil authority (military and 
Guard)? 
• Can you identify a trend that is and/or will impact military support to civil 
authorities, especially that provided by the National Guard (military and 
Guard)? 
Based upon the input received, emergency managers were asked two additional 
questions: 
• What would be the effect on response and recovery operations following a 
major disaster if anticipated military support was not available and no 
other alternative was identified? 
• What kinds of planning efforts have there been to identify contingencies 
should military support not be available?   
The responses received were fairly consistent. They are discussed in Chapters V 
and VI. 
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IV. MILITARY ROLES IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
For more than two hundred years, the U.S. military has played a significant role in 
protecting U.S. communities against a variety of dangers. While the level of that role has 
changed many times, it has never completely disappeared. Indeed, the use of the military 
in support of civil authority in particular has been so prevalent it is no wonder that we 
have again called upon them to play a pivotal role in the war on terrorism.  
From combat air patrols (CAP’s) over our cities to guarding critical infrastructure, 
the military’s presence has certainly been obvious since 9/11. Their responsibilities in 
these areas are outlined in numerous documents including the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept and the Joint Doctrine 
for Homeland Security.7 Most recently, the Joint Chiefs’ Strategy for Homeland Defense 
and Civil Support outlines the types of DoD support that may be provided to state, local 
and tribal jurisdictions.8 In addition, they continue to provide their historical support 
during non-terrorist events as well, and they have assumed a major role in foreign 
military operations around the world.  
Although the military hierarchy is predictability expressing support for their 
multiple roles, cracks are beginning to appear in their united front, up to and including 
doubts recently expressed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Even he is 
beginning to question the military’s ability to meet these multiple challenges from the 
 
7 National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C, Office of Homeland Security, July 
2002). 
  Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, GO/FO Draft (Washington D.C., Department of 
Defense, October 2003).                                                  
Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint publication 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, second draft 
(Washington D.C., Department of Defense, September 2003). 
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint publication 3-26: Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
(Washington D.C., Department of Defense, June 2005). 
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war on terrorism-at least circumspectly—lending further credence to concerns that 
military support for civil authorities may be in jeopardy.9
Are the military’s current roles concurrently sustainable? Can it accomplish its 
homeland security and general civil support missions without jeopardizing its homeland 
defense duties? If not what will be the likely course of action followed? Will the 
military’s commitment to combat readiness overcome its stated support to homeland 
security? A partial answer may be found through understanding just how strongly its 
defense role is supported. 
The primacy of that mission, at least in the minds of the military command, is 
made evident in the Department of Defense’s own publication on homeland security joint 
operations. That document states, “The most important purpose for DOD [Department of 
Defense] is the defense of the U.S. Homeland against external threats and foreign 
aggression”.10 Given the view that all roles are not equal, it is a logical assumption to 
believe that, if all roles cannot be supported, the defense role will win out.  
This paper attempts to identify just what the likelihood of such a loss in support 
would be, what that loss would translate into in terms of reduced or eliminated resources, 
and extrapolates what the impact on local jurisdictions could be. In fact, these questions 
form the central theme of this research project. 
If military support is built into response and recovery contingencies, and that 
support does not materialize, its loss may be devastating in terms of our ability to 
mitigate and recover from a major incident—natural or man made. Just how such a loss 
of support might affect operations, therefore, is clearly an issue that needs addressing. 
The ultimate purpose of the paper is to gain recognition for the fact that our 
current plans may be faulty to a dangerous degree. If military assistance to civil authority 
is truly jeopardized, we need to collectively recognize this fact, and to identify just how 
such a loss will impact critical incident management, and how we can overcome that loss.  
 
9 Donald Rumsfeld, Subject:Global War on Terrorism, memo to General Dick Myers, Paul Wolfowitz, 
General Pete Pace and Doug Feith (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, October 16, 2003). 
10 Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, October 
27, 2003), 12. 
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While it is unlikely that military support would not be forthcoming in the 
aftermath of a weapons of mass destruction event, there is at least some indication that 
the type and speed of the response may be negatively impacted by other responsibilities.  
There is also some evidence that, in the future, other kinds of critical incidents may not 
receive the kind and level of support likely in the case of the WMD incident. This 
developing trend becomes more evident when the full historical place of military support 
is examined. 
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Why have we turned to the military as a major resource in efforts to secure the 
homeland? Certainly one reason is the history of the military’s role in similar situations. 
In his article on domestic use of the military, Richard Kohn, a professor of history at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, points out that domestic security was 
initially one of the U.S military’s primary missions.11  
Both homeland defense and security roles for the National Guard in particular can 
be traced back to their original beginning with the establishment of the first U.S. militia 
in Massachusetts in 1636.12 Prior to the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, it was used to 
suppress rebellions, control strikes, aid in health emergencies and perform numerous 
other traditional law enforcement duties.13 In fact, it still does provide major assistance in 
many such instances. 
In a recent speech before Congress, Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Homeland Security, alluded both to the military’s long tradition, even after the Posse 
Comitatus Act, of civil support, and to its more recent efforts as well.14  
 
11 Richard H. Kohn, “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 4:1 (Spring 2003): 166. 
12 Major General Timothy J. Lowenberg (Adjutant General, Director, Military Department, State of 
Washington) unpublished manuscript, February 2005. 
13 Kohn, “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” 168. 
14McHale, “Address to the 108th Congress— Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services.”. 
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To summarize, the military has traditionally played a major role in homeland 
security, making it all the more likely that it will continue to be called upon for the 
foreseeable future.  
C. CURRENT ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
Numerous documents reference the military’s post-9/11 homeland security 
responsibilities. The National Strategy for Homeland Security describes three sets of 
circumstances that would cause the Department of Defense to become involved in 
homeland security. The first—which has been witnessed repeatedly—is “extraordinary 
circumstances” that would result in military missions such as combat air patrols and 
securing our critical infrastructure. The second is in response to an attack or natural 
disaster large enough to overcome local resources. The third is in mission-specific 
situations in support of other federal agencies (pg. 13). In another section, the Strategy 
outlines various forms of possible military support including “technical support and 
assistance to law enforcement; assisting in the restoration of law and order; loaning 
specialized equipment; and assisting in consequence management” (pg. 44).15
In his March 2004 presentation to Congress, McHale stated that the Department 
of Defense, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, “will provide 
military assistance to civil authorities to mitigate the results of disasters and catastrophes, 
including those resulting from a WMD attack.” In this same presentation, he mentions 
several particular areas of assistance available including protection of critical 
infrastructure, intelligence and communication, and aid in a variety of circumstances such 
as hurricanes, wildfires and suspected biological incidents.16
Another source of information on this issue may be found in the Joint Operating 
Concept that outlines several areas of possible assistance including Military Assistance to 
Civil Authorities (MACA), Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies 
(MSCLEA), and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS). It also lists three 
 
15 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 13. 
16 McHale, “Address to the 108th Congress— Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats 
and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services. 
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responsibilities in the area of Emergency Preparedness (EP)—Continuity of Operations 
(COOP); Continuity of Government (COG); and Other Roles.17
Additional information on the types of assistance currently available may be 
found in the Department of Defense’s own records as well. According to a recent General 
Accounting Office (GAO) report, The Department of Defense claims to have provided 
support for more than 200 non-military missions during fiscal 2001 and 2002. These 
missions included “assistance in fighting wildfires, recovering from tropical storms, 
providing support for national security events (such as the presidential inauguration and 
2002 Olympic Games) and for other purposes.”18  
All of these documents suggest the kinds of events that will trigger military 
assistance, but few mention the specific resources available except for the more obvious 
ones. Much of the information on this question, therefore, must be extrapolated from 
actual incidents. 
Some publicized examples of assistance have included use of military intelligence 
and communications capabilities (presidential inauguration and Olympic Games), and 
satellite photography (Mid-Atlantic sniper incidents). The Air National Guard has been 
used for combat air patrols (CAP’s), drug interdiction and border security. The Army 
National Guard has been utilized for critical infrastructure protection, military base and 
border security, and response to natural disasters.19
D. ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD 
Some of the uses of the Air and Army National Guard have been mentioned, but 
simply listing the Guard as just one military force among others does not give them their 
just due. Based on a combination of publications and documented assistance provided 
during actual events, it is very clear that the primary responsibility for providing military 
response to homeland security events has been given to the National Guard. 
 
17 Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, GO/FO Draft, 10-11. 
18 Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military 
Missions (Washington D.C., General Accounting Office, July 2003), 9. 
19 For example, see: Kohn, “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” 183. 
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For example, following 9/11 it was the Guard that provided critical infrastructure 
protection for hundreds of bridges and airports. In fact, they are still providing this 
protection in several places. This trend can also be seen in major incidents during the past 
few years when Guard units were the primary source of military assistance following 
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other natural disasters. The role of the National 
Guard as the primary resource for supporting civil authority is more clearly spelled out in 
the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security, which identifies the Guard as “normally the 
first responder to CS [Civil Support] events.”20
The Guard also provides assistance through their Weapons of Mass Destruction—
Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST’s) that are designed specifically to provide civil 
support—a major departure from the duties of most other military units. The mission of 
these teams, which are scheduled to eventually be located in each state, is to respond to 
WMD events for support and assessment. According to the Joint Doctrine Report, these 
teams, which operate under Title 32 U.S.C., are “likely to be the first large-scale military 
responder to a WMD incident site or area.”21
What all of this means when taken together is that, while certainly not the 
exclusive provider of military resources in support of civil authority, the Guard is the 
most often called upon. It is the resource most often provided by the Department of 
Defense or through the authority of state governors.  
When local jurisdictions require state and/or federal assistance to properly 
respond to and recover from major disasters, and military assistance is provided, that 
assistance almost always comes from the National Guard. Operating under either state or 
federal lead as authorized by federal statute, the Guard is generally the resource of choice 
for logistical support, security, disorder response and other kinds of services.  
The decision to use this particular segment of the military is based on both logic 
and tradition.  
 
20 General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces 
for Domestic Military Missions, 15. 
21 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26 Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security SecondDraft, 
II-9. 
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1. Logic of Using the National Guard 
Use of the Guard is logically dictated for at least three reasons: 
Relative ease of activation—Guard units can be activated directly by governors 
under state status conditions (state funded/state controlled), under Title 32 authority 
(federally funded/state controlled) or under Title 10 Authority (federally funded and 
controlled). Under either state status or Title 32, the state retains command and control. 
No similar authority for direct control exists for either active duty or other reserve units. 
Proximity—Guard units are based in all fifty states. This fact can minimize 
response times and logistics issues. In the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, there is 
only one major, active military base left—Travis AFB. On the other hand, there are 
myriad National Guard units, including a full-time Civil Support Team (CST).  
Type of support available—Although there are certainly a wide variety of 
disasters that can fall on a community, most require similar kinds of responses. Most 
require either security and rescue personnel to maintain order and search for 
injured/trapped victims, medical personnel to treat the injured, transportation equipment 
and personnel to move resources and supplies or similar types of expertise. These are the 
kinds of trained personnel and equipment available through the National Guard. 
When comparing these attributes with those of other kinds of military 
organizations, the logic of deploying the National Guard becomes fairly obvious. 
2. Tradition of Using of the Guard 
Kohn points out that the National Guard and its predecessor organizations 
(colonial militias) is the oldest military force in the United States.22 Its history brims with 
examples of times and circumstances that guardsmen have been used to support civil 
authority. In fact, protecting their communities has always been one of the key reasons 
for the continuing existence of the Guard. From defending against Indian attacks to 
responding to acts of insurrection, the Guard has always been at the forefront in 
maintaining domestic order. 
                                                 
22 Kohn, “Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,” 166. 
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In contemporary times, the Guard has not only responded to terrorist attacks, but 
also to wildfires, tropical storms and national security special events as well as other high 
profile incidents that pose a great threat to the peace and security of the community. They 
have not served as true first responders, but provided a major resource when local 
jurisdictions became overwhelmed.23
Given this historical role, especially when combined with the logic of the choice, 
it seems inevitable that the Guard would and should continue playing the pivotal role they 
have in the past when it comes to domestic security. However, their role in homeland 
defense is equally long and rich.  
Throughout the 19th century, the Guard provided the bulk of troops during war 
times to augment a relatively small standing army. That role initially continued into the 
20th century as well. During World War I, nearly half of U.S. Army forces were 
guardsmen. Although percentages dropped during World War II, National Guard units 
were still some of the first deployed and last to leave the theater.  
During the Cold War, Guard involvement in battle shrunk somewhat, but 
members still served in Korea and Vietnam. By the 1990’s, however, the trend had 
reversed itself. During Desert Storm, more than 75,000 Army and Air Guardsmen were 
deployed. The use of the Guard for military missions, even absent a major war, was set in 
1991 and continues to this day. With a standing army of about 500,000 men and women, 
simultaneous operations in such diverse places as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Haiti have made use of the National Guard and other reserve units essential. Through this 
latter period, it must be emphasized that the Guard’s domestic security role also 
continued, and it remains the primary source of such aid to civil authorities to this day. In 
essence, a discussion focusing on military support to civil authorities is really a 
discussion about National Guard support to civil authorities. 
 
 
23 General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces 
for Domestic Military Missions, 9. 
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V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY AID 
A  HOW THE U.S. SYSTEM FUNCTIONS 
Establishing the fact that the National Guard is a major resource during critical 
incidents is a relatively easy and straightforward process. It can be determined by a 
simple exercise that documents historic and current use. The more complex question is 
just how important is that support? What is it that communities depend upon the Guard to 
provide that is so essential and that can’t be obtained through some other source? To 
answer this question, one must first understand how the United States is organized for 
and handles major disasters. 
The United States employs a unique, three-tier system of government—federal, 
state and local. Sometimes operating in collaboration, occasionally overlapping, these 
individual tiers generally work independently from one another by assuming primary 
responsibility for various kinds of services. This model presents both opportunities and 
challenges. 
Local jurisdictions assume most of the responsibility for maintaining public order 
within their area of operation, which includes maintaining sufficient emergency response 
capabilities to handle most kinds of incidents. The benefit of this model is that it provides 
an opportunity for communities to tailor such services to their individual needs and 
priorities. Sometimes, though, an event occurs that is so large, or so devastating, or has 
such a massive casualty and/or damage potential that it quickly exhausts the individual 
jurisdiction’s resources. The challenge of the system then becomes finding a means to 
rush additional assistance to the location in a timely manner. 
When an event threatens to overcome the resources of the individual jurisdiction, 
it can appeal to adjacent or nearby agencies for help but eventually, if the event is large 
enough in scale, the request lands on state government. Virtually all states have 
developed mutual aid systems for the various components of their emergency services, 
and virtually all are voluntary—other local jurisdictions can agree or refuse to assist. 
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If a state is loathe to commit other regular first responder agencies, or unable to 
do so, it has few options. A governor can activate his/her own Guard units, and quite 
often that is exactly what happens. It can also appeal to the federal government for 
assistance. Such requests generally follow a cumbersome path before actual resources are 
deployed.  
These two options—activating Guard units under state authority or requesting 
assistance from the federal government—can be done independently or simultaneously. 
Both options have benefits and deficiencies. 
Activating Guard units under state authority is a relatively fast procedure, but 
limits response to in-state resources, and the costs are ultimately absorbed by the state. 
Requesting resources from the federal government can take all or some of the financial 
burden off the state, but it usually takes much longer to acquire approval and receive 
assistance. That leaves a third or combination course. 
In this latter example, a state may initially activate some Guard units while also 
requesting aid from the federal government. This approach may result in some shared 
costs and access to greater resources.  
Regardless of the route employed, military forces often represent the largest 
response group. The reasons for this are fairly simple to grasp: 
Manpower—No state or federal agency has manpower in quantities anywhere 
near that of the armed forces. Military resources are spread throughout the country—
particularly Guard units—and generally more prepared to respond. States can call upon 
local jurisdictions to assist through a mutual aid agreement, but such agreements are 
voluntary, placing the state in a precarious position. Although federal assistance is also 
technically not a given, National Guard use by the states is, assuming the units are not 
already activated for other missions under federal authority—an assumption that may 




Equipment—A reason similar to the manpower issue is one of available 
equipment. The Department of Defense controls vast transportation resources including 
vehicles, cargo planes and ships. It can throw massive quantities of material at a problem 
faster than anyone else can.  
Training-In most disasters, the resource needs are similar if not identical. They 
usually include, as pointed out earlier, people trained in field medical services, security, 
heavy equipment operation and so forth. With the possible exception of medical 
assistance, no other agency has individuals trained in these specific areas of expertise; at 
least not in the quantities available to the military. 
In addition, various Guard units have some very specialized training that can and 
often is of great help. This includes Air Guard helicopters and pilots that can aid in 
searches, assist in security operations and carry water to help fight wildland fires.  Also in 
this category are the Civil Support Teams (CST’s)—twenty-two member, full-time teams 
trained to assist in weapons of mass destruction incidents.  
Funding—the Department of Defense has the largest budget of any agency in the 
federal government. It can be argued, although the department might refute this, that it 
can absorb the costs associated with using its resources during a critical incident much 
more easily than other federal agencies can. Of course, this issue only becomes relevant 
when federal resources are provided.  
All of these reasons make a strong argument for use of the military when massive 
resource needs exist. Certainly some other alternatives may be considered, but none 
match the military in terms of sheer size and—at least historically—availability.  
Just how important is this aid to local communities? That becomes the next key 
question. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
A review of the historical use of the military—again primarily the National 




relative importance of this resource. An even clearer understanding of the critical value of 
military assistance becomes evident when the “customers” of that support are 
interviewed—emergency managers. 
As a group, emergency managers are generally responsible for coordinating the 
initial response to and at least part of the recovery from a major incident. Much of the 
success, or failure, of their efforts rests on pre-event planning. Anticipating and 
appropriately preparing for various kinds of events ultimately plays a crucial role in how 
well response and recovery efforts go. This must, out of necessity, include planning for 
how, when and from where additional resources can be quickly obtained. This 
knowledge, in turn, provides a working platform from which key deficiencies can be 
addressed. 
The kinds and extent of preparation can vary from one area to another and from 
one kind of event to another. Some fairly universal examples of pre-event planning 
include such activities as pre-positioning resources, identifying evacuation routes and 
emergency shelters, providing training and exercises, and acquiring critical equipment. 
More on point for this research is the part of pre-event planning that includes 
consideration of outside assistance.  
All states have some form of mutual aid plans for their primary emergency 
response disciplines. As of the writing of this paper, forty-eight states have signed the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) supported by the National 
Emergency Managers Association (NEMA) and California is on the verge of signing, 
leaving only Hawaii out of the pact. 
This agreement provides a platform from which states can request and receive 
assistance from other states. A recent example of how this works is the mutual aid 
response to Hurricane Ivan. According to a NEMA press release, Florida had requested 
and received aid from nine other states, Alabama received assistance from five states and, 
as of the date of the press release, West Virginia’s request for personnel and heavy 
equipment was being acted upon. Even with this compact, and the potential access to  
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millions of emergency responders throughout the country, the National Guard is 
continuing to play a pivotal role in pre-event planning as well as incident response and 
recovery operations.24
Tracy Hein, Emergency Services Manager for the Office of Emergency Services 
in Contra Costa County, was one of several individuals interviewed for this paper. She 
acknowledged that California’s event planning tree often depends upon rapid support 
response from state and federal authorities. In her experience, the National Guard has 
provided the vast majority of that response. She described critical assistance provided by 
the Guard in the past for riots, critical infrastructure protection and during numerous 
natural disasters including fires, floods and earthquakes.25
In all of the interviews conducted for this paper, it was evident that relief was a 
built-in component of most response and recovery plans, and that the Guard was 
considered one of two major resource origins, the other being mutual aid compacts for 
law enforcement and fire agencies.  
David Longshore, an emergency services manager for the city of New York, 
agreed that National Guard support is a critical component of both planning and actual 
response phases. He also provided first-hand experience of the Guard’s importance by 
describing all of the support received by the city following the 9/11 attacks. 
Some of the more critical roles played by the Guard included logistical support, 
combat air patrols—which provided a much-needed psychological lift for the city’s 
residents—planning and scene management expertise and security work. The latter was 
an extremely important factor because guardsmen replaced city police officers 
performing routine security and traffic duties, allowing the police department to 
concentrate its resources on rescue and recovery operations.26
 
24“EMAC resources deployed to Florida, Alabama in Response to Hurricane Ivan: Missions Ongoing 
for Charley, Frances,” National Emergency Managers’ Association, http://www.nemaweb.org [Accessed 
December 1, 2004]. 
25 Tracy Hein (Emergency Services Director, Contra Costa Office of Emergency Services) interview 
with author, Martinez, CA, November 15, 2004. 
26 David Longshore (Emergency Services Manager, New York Office of Emergency Management) 
interview with author, Monterey, CA, December 14, 2004. 
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Another individual interviewed was Michael Petrie, a former emergency services 
manager for the city and county of San Francisco, instructor at the Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security and member of DMAT Team 6.27 Petrie confirmed the significance 
of guard support in his jurisdiction’s planning process for incidents such as riots, 
earthquakes, fires and WMD events.28
The single most important issue that surfaced during the interviews, however, did 
not focus on the importance of the Guard itself, but rather on the issue of planning for 
alternatives. Virtually no one seems to be considering the possibility of the Guard being 
either unable to or unwilling to respond, and no one could identify a viable alternative 
resource. When asked directly what they would do if Guard assistance were requested but 
not available, none of the managers were able to provide a satisfactory answer.  
All agreed that, at least in the case of a major incident with substantial casualty 
and damage levels, a lack of assistance from the Guard would seriously impair mitigation 
efforts. As Petrie pointed out, emergency responders are quickly exhausted following a 
major event. They are often required to work twelve hours on and twelve hours off for 
the duration of the event, which can last several days if not weeks. Without relief, he 
believes emergency responders’ capabilities will erode quickly, impacting performance.  
This lack of planning for alternatives is not exclusively a state or local 
phenomenon. Dr. C. J. LaCivita, Executive Director of the Defense Resource 
Management Institute, Monterey, candidly expressed doubt that anyone within the federal 
government in general and the Department of Defense in particular had identified the 
issues involved or taken a systematic approach to viewing the concerns raised by this 
research. He also believes that the current dual role of the Guard is taking a toll on Guard 
resources. He projects both demands will continue for some time, and that this may lead 
to some serious problems in the near future.29
 
27 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams have been established throughout the United States by the 
federal government. 
28 Michael Petrie (Emergency Services Manager, Office of Emergency Services, City and County of 
San Francisco) interview with author, Monterey, CA, December 8, 2004. 
29 C. J. LaCivita, PhD (Executive Director, Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval 
Postgraduate School) interview with author, Monterey, CA, October 17, 2004. 
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Perhaps the lack of concern among emergency managers is due to the existence of 
other viable alternatives, readily available to fill any gap left by a lack of response from 
the National Guard.  
C. ALTERNATIVES 
It would be patently unfair to downplay the role of non-military resources 
available during major incidents. Myriad local, state, federal and even private sources of 
support are often available. However, in major disasters, the support provided by the 
military is generally confined to two categories: special units (e.g. helicopter support, 
CST’s) or massive support providing large contingents of personnel and/or equipment. 
These types of resources, therefore, will define the limits of a discussion of possible 
alternatives in this paper. 
1. Air, Sea, Land Transportation 
Smaller, contained incidents can likely find alternative ways to transport 
personnel and deliver equipment and supplies, but major events covering large areas may 
find it more difficult to replace military capabilities. In particular, air and water transport 
abilities clearly mark the military as unique. Even other countries depend among U.S. 
military assistance during major events. The most recent example of this is the 
destruction following the earthquake and resulting tsunami off the coast of Sumatra. 
Military transport capabilities have and, at the time this report was written, are still being 
used to ferry personnel and supplies to the hardest hit areas.  
2. Heavy Equipment and Operators 
There is an abundance of heavy equipment and operators throughout the United 
States, but it is owned by the private sector. To date, no plan or authority has been 
established for securing this resource for use during a disaster, or even for how to identify 
and transport it to the point of need. Response and recovery efforts are time sensitive. 
Delays in resource availability can be devastating. Only the military currently has control 
of both the equipment and operators and means to quickly move them to where they are 
needed. 
3. Large Troop Deployment 
This area has much room for developing alternatives, and efforts to do just that 
have begun. There are millions of first responders in the United States. Many are better 
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trained and much more experienced than their Guard counterparts in several critical 
areas. Examples that immediately come to mind are police and fire fighters that are 
periodically called upon to aid other jurisdictions through local or state mutual aid 
agreements. The development of the Emergency Mutual Aid Compact mentioned earlier 
represents an effort to provide regional or even national support during critical incidents. 
However, also mentioned already is the fact that these agreements are all voluntary.  
Individual agencies are free to respond or not as they choose and, while deployed, 
although nominally under the command of the requesting agency, they still operate as 
independent units that can control what they will or will not do, and are free to leave 
when they choose to. This is a remarkable resource, but not one that is highly dependable. 
An argument can be made, though; a future decline in Guard dependability would 
increase the value of this collective resource. Security and fire assistance aside, other 
kinds of deployment are not as readily apparent. This is certainly true for medical and 
rescue assistance. 
Like police and fire agencies, there are numerous medical personnel that could be 
called upon to assist immediately following a major disaster. However, like heavy 
equipment and operators, there is little in the way of an organized plan or authority 
established to rush resources to the scene of a major disaster. The most notable exception 
to this is development of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT’s) that are 
comprised of volunteers formed into small units that have medical supplies already stored 
and ready for transport. These teams are equipped to operate without relief for seventy-
two hours. According to Michael Petrie, they are then supposed to be re-supplied by 
trains pre-positioned and loaded with medical supplies. As critical as this resource can be, 
it has too distinct limitations.30
First, like the other mutual aid plans discussed, these teams are comprised of 
volunteers that can decline to respond. How likely is it that a significant portion of the 
volunteers would decline? Petrie candidly admits that would depend upon the event and  
 
 
30 Michael Petrie (Emergency Services Manager, Office of Emergency Services, City and County of 
San Francisco) interview with author, Monterey, CA, December 4, 2004. 
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location. For example, a major event in the San Francisco Bay Area could easily cause a 
conflict of duties for Petrie and several team members that provide emergency services 
for their own jurisdiction.  
A second limitation to these groups is that they have no surgery capabilities. This 
severely limits their usefulness. Military field hospitals, in comparison, are staffed by 
medical personnel who are not given an individual choice whether to respond or not or 
what kinds of duties they will perform. Such units are also equipped to provide surgical 
care as well. As important as DMAT’s can be, they simply cannot replace full military 
medical units. 
Another resource mentioned was specialized units. These include expertise like 
that provided by the National Guard Civil Support Teams. Arguably, there are several 
alternatives for at least some fields of expertise. The Federal Emergency Management 
Administration has several individuals that are prepared to respond following a major 
incident to provide critical expertise. The Centers for Disease Control have specially 
trained and equipped teams that can assist during major health incidents such as 
biological events. Federal teams are available to respond to nuclear accidents. The list 
goes on.  
This area represents perhaps the greatest availability for non-military response, 
but it should be noted that all of the types of expertise mentioned represent federal 
resources. States do not enjoy a similar set of options short of requesting federal aid, and 
none of the alternate resources have the capabilities of the military in terms of sheer 
quantities and ability to respond. In other words, there really are no viable options to 
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VI. WILL MILITARY ASSISTANCE BE AVAILABLE? 
The historical importance of the military for ensuring homeland security and 
mitigating the damage caused by major disasters is well documented, as is its currently 
assigned roles. The continuing dependence upon this assistance among emergency 
managers is also fairly well established. The remaining question, therefore, is how 
available is that assistance likely to be in the future? Will it be as readily available as it 
has been, or are there new factors developing that may reduce or eliminate it altogether? 
If the National Guard in particular remains as available as it has always been, 
there is little need to consider other options. Under this model, we are collectively doing 
what we need to do to prepare for various disasters including major terrorist attacks. 
What if the Guard is not available though? What if no contingency for such a scenario 
has been allowed for, a major incident causes devastating and widespread casualties or 
damages, local responders are quickly overwhelmed and the cavalry doesn’t arrive?  
Military assistance is such an integral part of our collective response and recovery 
planning efforts that its absence would be impossible to readily overcome. If it is in 
jeopardy, therefore, some kind of systematic identification and development of 
alternative resources must be considered. These issues bring us back to the ultimate 
question—what is the likelihood that future military assistance, particularly assistance 
from the National Guard, may be reduced or eliminated?  
Deriving the answer to that question is difficult in the extreme, at least with any 
degree of empirical accuracy. It is based on so many variables, inextricably locked 
together in such a complex pattern that some degree of subjective interpretation and 
subsequent assumptions is almost inevitable. Adding further difficulty is the fact that the 
military itself has been reluctant to admit it has limitations, and much of the data needed 
to conduct a valid, scientific analysis is not made available to independent researchers. 
However, there is considerable anecdotal evidence to support some degree of doubt, and 
recent statements by key military personnel strengthen that concern.  
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A. EMERGENCE OF COMPETING DEMANDS 
It has always been recognized that the Guard has both security and defense roles, 
but high mission demand in one area has historically been accompanied by relatively low 
demand in the other. This is no longer the case. Since 9/11, there has been an equally 
high demand on the Guard in both areas. This is unique in the Guard’s history, and is 
stretching its capabilities. This problem is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. 
Colonel Wayne Wojda, National Guard Bureau Liaison Officer with the Defense 
Resources Management Institute (DRMI), Monterey, conceded that the high levels in 
both defense and security demands was historically unusual and likely to continue for at 
least the next decade.31
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale made a similar observation during 
his March 3, 2003 statement to the House Armed Services Committee, stating that:  
In the past, the National Guard was dual-tasked. In wartime, the nation has 
expected the Guard to go fulfill its mission overseas; in peacetime, the 
nation has expected the Guard to be available for domestic emergencies. 
The terrorist attacks of September the 11th, have now taught us that the 
National Guard may be called upon to do both at the same time, not by 
accident but because our nation’s enemies may attack us in both places at 
once.32
McHale’s statement addresses terrorist acts only. When the need for support 
during other kinds of disasters is factored in, it is very obvious that the Guard is being 
pulled in two directions to a much greater magnitude than ever before. 
In interviews with other Guard officials, a general consensus was noted that 
supports viewing current demand levels as highly unusual and potentially very 
problematic. This view of impending problems goes all the way to the top of Guard and 
reserve commands. According to the Los Angeles Times, Lieutenant General James 
Helmly, commander of the Reserves, has expressed personal concerns regarding the 
 
31 Colonel Wayne Wojda (National Guard Bureau Liaison Officer, Defense Resources Management 
Institute) interview with author, Monterey, CA, October 27, 2004. 
32 McHale, “Address to the 108th Congress— Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats 
and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services.”  
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status of the Reserve force to Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker. Helmsly 
reportedly advised Schoomaker that demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
placed the Reserves “in grave danger of being unable to meet other operational 
requirements.” Helmsly bluntly told the Pentagon that the reserves are “rapidly 
degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.”33  
National Guard Commander Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum recently 
expressed similar concerns. In a New York Times’ article, Blum is quoted as saying he 
needed an additional $ 20 billion to replace Guard equipment destroyed or left for 
replacement units in Iraq or Afghanistan in order to ensure Guard units “will have enough 
equipment to deal with emergencies at home.”34  
More recently, problems experienced during response and recovery operations 
following Hurricane Katrina pointed to severe shortages in critical equipment among 
Guard units, prompting Blum to admit to a severe problem. He is quoted in one article as 
acknowledging trucks, bulldozers and communications equipment “all were in short 
supply for Katrina.”35
The concerns being expressed by Guard and Reserve officials, including the 
respective commanders of these forces, combined with McHale’s statement and 
substantial anecdotal evidence clearly suggest that these military units are being 
compelled to maintain high mission demands in both homeland defense and homeland 
security roles. This dual personality is beginning to have severe, negative impacts. Some 
of the more obvious ones, discussed in the next section, include recruiting, training, 
combat readiness and equipment problems. 
B. CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF HIGH DEMANDS  
Just how does the high level of both defense and security mission demand impact 
the Guard? One very good source of information on this question is the U.S. 
 
33Mark Mazzetti, “Military Official Says Army Reserve Close to Broken,” Contra Costa Times, 
January 6, 2005, A11. 
34 Eric Schmitt, “Recruiting Numbers Fall Sharply for Guard,” Contra Costa Times, December 17, 
2004, A31. 
35Mark Sappenfield, “For Guard, Equipment Falls Short,” Christian Science Monitor, 
http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20050927393763.html [Accessed September 27, 2005]. 
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government’s General Accounting Office (GAO). In its July 2003 report on homeland 
defense several key concerns with current and projected Guard responsibilities in areas 
such as personnel tempo, training and combat readiness were identified. 36
1. Personnel Tempo 
The report defines personnel tempo as “the amount of time that a member of the 
armed forces is engaged in their official duties that makes it infeasible to spend off duty 
time at the member’s home, home port (for Navy servicemembers), or in the member’s 
civilian residence”. The report noted that the tempo has been and continues to be high for 
National Guard personnel (p.18). This relatively high tempo has some practical impacts. 
Increased duty assignments create morale issues within Guard units that affects 
how many individual members elect to stay when their current contract expires. Guard 
officials interviewed admitted that they fear massive retention problems as units return 
from Iraq. They also admit that public knowledge of just how much time Guard 
personnel are spending overseas is hurting recruitment that is now lagging a  dramatic 
30% behind goals for the first time in several years. That decline may be exacerbated 
even more as individual members of Guard units returning from extended tours overseas 
refuse to extend or renew their contracts. 
Another major source of personnel for the Guard is regular force members that 
have traditionally elected to maintain a relationship with the military even after their 
regular duty enlistment is completed. These individuals have accounted for a significant 
portion of new Guard and reserve sing-ups. National Guard command officer Lieutenant 
General H. Steven Blum, recently stated that this group accounted for “about half” of its 
recruitment.37
2. Training Deficiencies  
The GAO report noted that servicemen are not maintaining sufficient training 
levels because they are missing key instruction while engaged in domestic missions (p. 
14). Guard officers interviewed also verified this fact. In many cases, even the nature of  
 
36General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces 
for Domestic Military Missions.  
37 Schmitt, “Recruiting Numbers Fall Sharply for Guard.” 
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the domestic missions assigned has conflicted with efforts to maintain essential skills 
because the assignments have not reflected duties associated with the individual’s normal 
mission.  
The report notes, for example, that approximately 8,000 National Guardsmen 
from 100 different units were assigned security duties at domestic Air Force bases 
immediately following the 9/11 attacks, but that only one of these units had training in 
their primary mission duties (p. 15).  
3. Reduced Combat Readiness 
The third immediate concern in the report was maintaining combat readiness. The 
report outlines incidents where security missions were effectively reducing combat 
readiness because guardsmen were either unable to complete training because of security 
missions or the missions themselves were providing experience counter to combat 
requirements.  
In the eyes of the Department of Defense, the dual responsibilities of the Guard 
are not of equal value. In at least one source, the department clearly states that “defense 
of the U.S. Homeland against external threats and foreign aggression” is their primary 
responsibility.38  
The department is certainly aware of the fact that domestic missions may be 
seriously impairing the combat readiness of Guard units that are being depended upon 
more and more to fill gaps in active duty forces. If nothing happens to either change 
current conditions or the department’s priorities, it seems reasonable to assume Guard 
units will begin being “saved” for higher priority missions in support of homeland 
defense. 
4. Equipment Burnout 
An area that was not covered in the GAO report, but that nevertheless raises great 
concern, is the issue of equipment burnout. Military planners develop future equipment 
maintenance and replacement needs on the basis of anticipated levels and kinds of use. 
This is true for Guard units as well, which are often not well equipped to begin with. Air 
 
38 Department of Defense. Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept 
(GO/FO Draft, 12. 
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National Guard combat planes, for example, have recorded significant flight hours since 
9/11 for combat air patrols over domestic cities that have substantially surpassed their 
planned use levels, increasing maintenance costs and shortening the planned life-span of 
several planes. This high demand on equipment is straining Guard budgets that are 
already low on the Department of Defense’s list of priorities, and is leaving units 
dangerously low on critical equipment needed during homeland security operations. 
In addition to comments quoted earlier by National Guard bureau chief Lt. 
General H. Steven Blum, U.S. Comptroller General David M. Walker has been reported 
to say that Guard officials have admitted that response to Hurricane Katrina was impeded  
by a lack of critical equipment including “satellite communications equipment, radios, 
trucks, helicopters and night vision goggles…”39
The department’s budget is beginning to flatten out following some significant 
increases in the past few years. It is likely that, except for overseas operations funding, 
the department’s budget will either level off or decrease for the next few years. This is a 
view shared by others, including Dr. LaCivita.40 Since there is no evidence suggesting the 
Guard’s position on the priority list will improve, it is likely that Guard equipment will 
continue to age faster than anticipated. Already strained budgets will not be able to fund 
accelerated maintenance schedules, and additional monies for acquiring replacement 
equipment sooner than anticipated will simply not be forthcoming.  The overall impact of 
these trends will be a Guard force that continues to be under-equipped. This can be 
critically important to localities in need of air and heavy equipment resources in 
particular. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
At this point, it is clear that several statements can be made with a reasonable 
degree of comfort. First and foremost, the military has historically played a major role in 
homeland security, and the responsibility for it continuing in that role is established in 
 
39 Drew Brown, “Wars Leave National Guard Short on Critical Equipment,” Miami Herald., 
http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20051021397626.html, [Accessed October 21, 2005]. 
40 C.J. LaCivita, PhD (Executive Director, Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval 
Postgraduate School) interview with author, Monterey, CA, October 17, 2004. 
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various documents including the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept.  
It is equally clear that the role of the Guard in active, overseas campaigns has 
increased significantly, and that increase is likely to represent a long-term trend. In his 
letter to the Pentagon, General Helmsly pointed out that approximately 40% of U.S. 
troops currently serving in Iraq are Reserve or National Guard forces, and he predicts this 
number will increase as unit rotations occur.41
This high mission demand in both areas of responsibility is beginning to have an 
adverse impact on the Guard, and the severity of that impact is increasing at an alarming 
rate. For the first time is many years, recruitment efforts have failed to meet goals. 
Specialty training and maintaining combat readiness are difficult-to-impossible, 
equipment is deteriorating much faster than budgets can absorb, and states are 
complaining Guard units are stretched too thin.  
As originally reported in a New York Times article, during a 2004 governors’ 
conference in Seattle, the governors held a meeting with Pentagon officials to complain 
about “the largest call-up of the National Guard since World War II.”42 According to this 
same article, governors complained of call-ups as high as 62% in some states. What many 
of the governors found particularly troubling was that these call-ups included Guard fire 
fighting units right when the fire season was beginning. The call-ups also impact how 
much equipment is available for fighting fires as well. According to one source, for 
example, California depends upon nine Blackhawk helicopters maintained by the Guard 
for fighting wild land fires, but all nine were scheduled for duty in Iraq beginning in 
September 2004.43
The absence of firefighters is not the only personnel problem. A recent call to the 
California National Guard confirmed that virtually all of the military police, 
transportation or engineer units normally headquartered in the San Francisco Bay area 
 
41 Mazzetti, Military Official Says Army Reserve Close to Broken, A1. 
42Sarah Kershaw, “Governors Say War Leaves Them Shorthanded,” Contra Costa Times, July 20, 
2004, A18. 
43 “Guard Spread Too Thin,” Contra Costa Times, July 22, 2004, A14, n.a. 
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were currently on active duty assignments outside the state. It was also confirmed that 
few of these kinds of units—the ones most typically needed during major disasters—were 
available anywhere in California. In some cases, the unit’s equipment was left in place 
because the called up force inherited equipment left behind by the unit being replaced. 
Unfortunately, there are few Guardsmen left that are trained to operate any of it. 
Another area of rising concern is the double impact on local emergency response 
agencies. Although no official numbers are available, it is fairly common to find that a 
significant percentage of Guardsmen hold emergency responder positions in their 
community. Consequently, states are not only losing the military resources they depend 
upon, but a substantial number of emergency personnel as well.  
The final answer to the question, given all of these indicators, is that military 
support to civil authorities may be unavailable or at least diminished in the near future. 
The word “may” is cautiously inserted because accurately predicting all of the variables 
affecting the military’s role is virtually impossible.  
Congress could somehow find the funds needed to increase active duty ranks 
sufficiently to end current Guard activation levels. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
military needs in places like Kosovo and Haiti could miraculously end and no new 
trouble spots emerge. The Pentagon could suddenly find all of the funds needed to re-
supply and properly outfit Guard units. States and the federal government could 
cooperatively create and fund homeland security resources outside the military chain.  
Many things are possible, but given current fiscal problems and global realities, 
none of these possibilities even comes close to the level of being a probability. Actual 
availability will most likely level off somewhere between no availability and historical 
availability. 
It is unlikely, for instance, that a terrorist attack the size and magnitude of the 
9/11 incidents would not evoke a major military response regardless of how thin it is 
stretched. Certainly key units, like the National Guard’s Civil Support Teams, will be 
available for the foreseeable future, and some other federal assets will continue to be 
available as well. What does seem to be evident, though, is that massive military 
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manpower and equipment deployment following a major incident will not be as readily 
available, especially if the incident has no national significance. Unfortunately, the vast 
majority of critical incidents fall into this category. 
The United States has suffered three WMD attacks within its borders in the last 
decade. Although none were labeled as such at the time, attacks on the Alfred P. Murrah 
federal building in Oklahoma, and both the Pentagon and World Trade Center attacks of 
9/11 would today qualify as WMD events. Last year alone, there were more major 
hurricane events than that in the Southeast, California suffered the worst firestorms in its 
history, west and mid-west states experienced major flooding and myriad other events 
caused major disruption to communities throughout the country. It is for these kinds of 
events that states and local jurisdictions may have to find alternate resources. 
If there is even a possibility that military support to civil authority has been or 
will be diminished, why are emergency planners not addressing the possibility? Why are 
states not demanding federal assistance in developing dedicated, homeland security 
resources? 
These kinds of questions are of paramount importance, but the answers are 
doomed to be subjectively worded, because there is no one cause. The reasons are 
different for different people in different jurisdictions at different government levels and 
in different professions. Even the impact of a reduction in military support will vary 
depending upon the jurisdiction and type of incident. It is possible, however, to get at 
least some idea of the impact by examining an individual incident model.  
In the following section, a worst-case scenario is presented based on an identified 
region and events. While the hundreds of variables that would come into play in an actual 
incident could significantly change the outcomes, those listed in the scenario are well 
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VII. UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE IMPACTS THROUGH 
DEVELOPMENT OF A SCENARIO 
Response and recovery efforts following a major disaster work much like a large, 
intricate mosaic. The complex activities of the various responders must work in a 
coordinated, time-sensitive manner to achieve the best results. If pieces are missing or 
delayed the finished product is flawed. Needed resources that fail to be delivered on-
scene in a timely manner can quickly turn rescue efforts into recovery operations.  
The National Guard represents a critical component of the overall response and 
recovery mosaic. Their historic assistance to civil authority is well documented and 
outlined in this paper. They remain, to this day, the chief military resource available to 
communities during incidents that overwhelm local jurisdictions.  
If the Guard cannot provide anticipated levels of support when needed, or their 
response is delayed, the affects can be devastating, especially if alternate resources have 
not been identified in advance. 
To illustrate what can happen when a key resource like the Guard is not available 
and replacements have not been identified, a scenario was carefully developed. Based on 
known dangers and real geographical, environmental and resource factors, each element 
was created with the assistance of one or more subject matter experts.  
A. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS 
Scenario development depended heavily upon the input of the following 
individuals: 
Deputy Chief Chris Suter, San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District.  
Chief Suter is a twenty-five year veteran of the fire services. In addition to his 
general expertise, he is considered an expert in emergency communications systems. 
Chief Suter is a member of the regional homeland security advisory committee, and 
serves on the committee established to create a regional emergency communications 
network. San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District is experienced in both wild land and 
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structure fires. It has responsibility for a major portion of the Oakland Hills and a large 
part of the Mt. Diablo foothills as well as several densely populated areas.  
Colonel Steven Smith (retired), POMSO Officer, SCANG 
Colonel Smith was the former South Carolina Army National Guard officer in 
charge of maintaining operational orders. He is knowledgeable about military planning 
for operations providing assistance to civil authorities, and has first-hand experience in 
the affects on the Guard of its dual roles following 9/11. 
Senior Emergency Planner Chris Boyer, Contra Costa Office of Emergency Services 
Mr. Boyer is a recognized expert in search and rescue operations and a key 
planner for regional responses to major events. Mr. Boyer serves as regional liaison to 
various agencies including the California National Guard. He is involved in on-going 
plans to review area dams and reservoirs to determine their ability to withstand a major 
earthquake, and in pre-planning emergency responses for dam failures as well as other 
natural and man made disasters. 
Commander Scott Daly, Contra Costa Office of the Sheriff 
Commander Daly is in charge of field operations for the Office of the Sheriff; one 
of the largest police agencies in California. His duties include planning for police 
response to major incidents and working closely with other agencies to develop joint 
operation policies and procedures. Commander Daly was also instrumental in creating the 
department’s helicopter unit. 
Supervisor Sandra Bradley, American Medical Response (AMR).  
Ms. Bradley is the supervisor of Clinical Education Services for AMR, the largest 
ambulance company in the United States and long-term provider for both emergency and 
basic medical transport services in the region. Ms. Bradley is also a paramedic and 




Colonel Terry Edinboro, Chief of MSCA, CA ANG 
Colonel Edinboro is the chief of the Military Support to Civil Authority 
Department at the Joint Operations Command Headquarters, Sacramento, California. He 
is responsible for both intelligence (J2) and operations (J3) programs. Among other 
duties, Colonel Edinboro oversees the Operations Centers that monitors incidents 
throughout the state and deploys both National Guard and Air Guard resources.  
Communications Systems Manager Terry Betts, Contra Costa Office of the Sheriff 
Mr. Betts oversees the various telecommunications systems employed by the 
Office of the Sheriff, including radio, telephone and cell phone devices. He also serves as 
the Sheriff’s representative on various regional and statewide committees, and acts as 
liaison to other public safety agencies throughout Alameda and Contra Costa counties. 
He is currently working with other telecommunications experts to develop a regional 
public safety radio communications network. 
B. BASIC PREMISES 
A scenario is a hypothetical set of circumstances that allow an analysis of the 
possible impact of certain variables introduced into the scene. To serve as a legitimate 
analytical tool the scene must be realistic. It must be based upon an event or series of 
events that are at least possible, and presented in a way that reflects how such an event(s) 
would most likely unfold in “real life.” The closer the scenario can come to either 
historical events or ones that are highly probable, the more value can be gleaned from a 
review of the outcomes presented. 
In developing this particular case, extreme care was taken to ensure the incident 
represents a realistic danger, and the outcomes envisioned are plausible given the factors 
imposed. The location is real and the geographical factors presented are accurate.  
The individual events were selected by reviewing historical incidents. They were 
then placed within the context of the scenario in a manner that parallels the actual event 




included, the changes represent ones that are highly possible and of great concern to local 
authorities, and the hypothetical event represents one with a high probability of 
occurrence. 
1. Location  
The setting for the scenario is the San Francisco Bay Area. The focus is on 
Alameda and Contra Costa counties that lie along the eastern edge of the Bay. The 
population of the focus area is approximately 2.5 million.  
Contra Costa and Alameda are adjacent counties with Alameda bordering Contra 
Costa’s southern boundary.  The counties comprise a single region broken into three 
distinct geographical areas. 
The western portion is a narrow, densely populated corridor bordered on the west 
and north by water, and on the east by a group of hills that will collectively be labeled the 
Oakland Hills for this scenario. On the south, Alameda County borders Santa Clara 
County. This area contains several key cities including Oakland, Berkeley and Richmond.  
The central portion is comprised of a series of connecting valleys. It is bordered 
on the north by water, on the west by the Oakland Hills and on the east by Mt. Diablo and 
its foothills. The area contains several major financial and business centers including 
Concord, Walnut Creek and Pleasanton. It is also the home of Lawrence Livermore and 
Sandia National Laboratories.  
Mt. Diablo and its foothills on the west divide Eastern Contra Costa from the 
central area. It is bordered by water on the north and east, including the Delta area. To the 
south, an eastern extension of the Mt. Diablo foothills separates the area from central 
Alameda. 
2. Transportation Systems 
Six major bridges connect this area to the North Bay and San Francisco Peninsula. 
There are also a number of smaller bridges across the Delta area, connecting East Contra 
Costa to San Joaquin and Sacramento counties. 
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Several major highways cross the region including Interstate 80 and Highways 
680, 580, 4 and 24. Highways 4, 24 and 580 provide the major points of connection 
between central and western portions of the region. All three highways pass through the 
Oakland Hills. 
There are three international airports and several smaller ones in the Bay Area. 
Oakland International Airport and four smaller fields—Hayward, Livermore, Buchanan 
and Byron—directly serve the Contra Costa-Alameda region.  
Several major rail lines also cross the region. These lines generally run along the 
eastern shore of the Bay, curving through the north end of the Oakland Hills. Two major 
rail corridors split at this point with one crossing the Sacramento River to Solano County 
and the other heading east through central and eastern Contra Costa, eventually crossing 
the Delta through a number of raised track sections and bridges. 
3. Weather Conditions 
Weather will play an important role in the development of the scenario. To create 
a realistic setting, historic conditions were identified and used. The incident takes place in 
early October. The selected weather pattern is based on data provided by Chris Suter44 
and Chris Boyer.45
The high temperatures are in the mid-eighties with a relative humidity of 16 and 
dry winds from the northeast at 15-20 mph with gusts in the hills to 30mph.  
C. CORE EVENTS 
The scenario is based upon three events that combine to form a catastrophic 
incident. 
1. A Major Earthquake along the Entire Hayward Fault 
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) forecasts a 62% chance of a major 
earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area within the next twenty-seven years.46 One of 
 
44 Chris Suter (Assistant Chief, San Ramon Valley Fire) interview with author, Danville, CA, May 4, 
2005. 
45 Chris Boyer (Emergency Services Manager, Contra Costa Office of Emergency Services) interview 
with author, Martinez, CA, April 21, 2005. 
46 USGS, http://quake.wr.usgs.gov/ [Accessed April 23, 2005]. 
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the most active faults in the area is the Hayward fault. The USGS predicts that a quake on 
this fault is certain, although they cannot predict when it will occur.47
The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), a regional planning agency, 
has developed damage estimates for an earthquake on this fault. These estimates, based 
upon an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.9 on the Richter scale, will be used to 
extrapolate damage resulting from one of the magnitude used for the scenario.48
2. Terrorists Attack a 10” Steel, High-Pressure Gasoline Pipeline  
The pipeline depicted is an existing high-pressure line running through Contra 
Costa County that alternately transports gasoline and aviation fuel. This same pipeline 
ruptured on November 9, 2004, killing five and setting fire to several buildings. In this 
event, a small terrorist group that has focused on the pipeline as one of several possible 
targets in the area decides that the earthquake has created massive disruptions, 
particularly in emergency response resources. They decide that an attack on the pipeline 
would further disrupt response and recovery efforts. The location selected is the Union 
Pacific Railroad service yard at the western edge of Martinez, the county seat and 
northern-most city in central Contra Costa. The yard is located on a narrow piece of flat 
land between the northern slope of the Oakland Hills and the Sacramento River. The 
pipeline runs through portions of the yard, adjacent to railroad tracks and at the foot of 
the hills. It is readily accessible at several points.  
At the time of the earthquake, it is carrying gasoline being pumped through at the 
rate of thousands of gallons per minute. The closest cut-off valve is located at the eastern 
edge of Martinez in the area of the Shell Refinery. The destruction of this pipeline, either 
through accident or intentional act, is a cause of concern for authorities. Chris Boyer 
comments that the pipeline represents a known danger, and that its destruction could 
cause serious consequence.49  
 
 
47 USGS, http://quake.usge.gov/research/geology/paleoseis/index.html [Accessed May 7, 2005]. 
48Association of Bay Area Governments, http://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/eqmaps/eqmaps.html 
[Accessed May 6, 2005].  
49 Chris Boyer (Emergency Services Manager, Contra Costa Office of Emergency Services) interview 
with author, Martinez, CA, April 25, 2005. 
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3. A Major Wild Land Fire in the Oakland Hills 
The pipeline explosion will start a fire at the northern edge of the Oakland Hills. 
Prevailing winds and overall weather patterns will quickly push the flames toward the 
crown of the hills, and will also expand it both east and west along the slopes.  
The fire will occur during the same time of year and under the same general 
weather conditions that prevailed during the 1991 Oakland Hills fire. That fire burned 
along the western slopes of the hills, through Oakland and Berkeley, destroying 2,500 
buildings, killing 25 people and burning 1,600 acres.  
D. MAJOR PREMISES 
The setting for the incident includes several projected factors. 
1. California National Guard Units Are Having a Difficult Time 
Maintaining Adequate Readiness Levels Due to a Combination of 
Factors 
Constant deployment for both defense and security reasons have hurt the Guard’s 
ability to maintain training schedules. Equipment is being used up faster than projected, 
increasing maintenance and repair costs well beyond budgets. Most critical of all, 
recruitment and retention efforts continue to fall short. For the second year in a row, both 
were down nearly 50%. As a result, a number of units have been deactivated, and staff 
reassigned to keep more critical units at full staffing. 
California’s inability to maintain acceptable readiness levels would usually have 
resulted in the reassignment of the deactivated units to other states, but the universal 
nature of the problems being faced by California has at least temporarily spared the state 
from permanently losing these units.  
The key reason behind the lagging recruitment and retention efforts is considered 
to be the massive deployment of Guard units overseas. More than half of all California 
units have been deployed to one hot spot or another. Virtually every military police, 
engineer, transportation and air support unit is either deployed or scheduled for an 
overseas tour. At the time of the scenario incident, Guard strength has fallen from over 
eighteen thousand shortly after 9/11 to just under fourteen thousand. About 58% of that 
force is either deployed overseas or training out-of-state for deployment overseas. The 
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remaining Guardsmen number approximately 5,800. They are comprised primarily of 
administrative staff and new recruits either in the training process or waiting to begin 
training. Realistically, the California Guard can claim about 1,900 fully trained 
Guardsmen available for deployment. 
2. Fire Officials Throughout the Western United States Have Expressed 
Concern Over Dangers the Approaching Fire Season Will Present 
A major shift in historic weather patterns caused the Pacific Northwest to receive 
much less rain than usual. The Southwest, on the other hand, received heavier-than-
normal rainfall. Both of these conditions have lead to warnings of increased fire danger.  
In the Northwest, lower rain totals have left shrubs much dryer than usual, 
significantly raising the burn index. The index, used by fire officials to forecast fire 
potential, is based on a formula that takes into account several variables including fuel 
moisture levels, relative humidity and wind. In the Southwest, heavy rainfall has caused a 
huge growth in grass and shrubs, greatly increasing the amount of fuel available.50
3. Fire Officials are Concerned Over a Lack of Adequate Air Support  
Air support is used for three primary purposes during wild land fires: observation, 
water and retardant dumps, and personnel and equipment transport. Fixed wing craft can 
serve as observation platforms and can deliver large quantities of water or retardant if 
equipped properly, but personnel and equipment transport is primarily the province of 
helicopters. Certainly getting resources to an area can be achieved through the use of 
fixed wing craft, and firefighters can be dropped via parachute. It still remains for 
helicopters, however, to provide the bulk of air transport in and around a fire area.  
Transporting personnel and equipment requires heavy lift capabilities that far 
exceed those of most civil aviation helicopters. The military remains the only major 
resource for helicopters with adequate lifting power to be used for these kinds of 
missions. Most air tankers are maintained by private companies operating under federal 
contracts. 
 
50 Chris Suter (Assistant  Chief, San Ramon Valley Fire) interview with author, Danville, CA, May 4, 
2005.     
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The contract fleet of air tankers maintained by the federal government has been 
grounded while investigations into several crashes continue. This leaves approximately 
700 helicopters with tank capacities ranging to 325 gallons plus a small number of lighter 
fixed wing aircraft with 800-1200 gallon water tank capacities the only air support 
available through the federal services. This does not include military aircraft, but almost 
all available military craft that can be used for fire fighting are deployed overseas 
including the 129th Air Squadron stationed at Moffett Field. This unit has been crucial to 
Bay Area emergency response, providing air support for wild land fires and search and 
rescue operations.  
Although there are a handful of state and locally maintained helicopters equipped 
to respond to wild land fires, the number is grossly inadequate. Fire officials estimate that 
a major fire, like the 1991 Oakland Hills firestorm, could easily require one hundred 
helicopters to provide adequate coverage. Getting that much air support to a Bay Area 
fire in a timely manner represents a major logistical problem.51
4. Mutual Aid Pacts Are Voluntary and Based Upon Several Variables 
that Make Projecting Available Assistance Impossible 
California has a number of well-defined mutual aid agreements, but all are based 
upon voluntary compliance. Individual agencies are free to agree or decline to send 
requested aid. Although there is an excellent history of cooperation, there is an equally 
impressive list of agencies that have declined to assist because of conditions within their 
own jurisdictions.  
Even the much-touted Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), and 
subscribed to by every state, with the exception of California and Hawaii, is based upon 
voluntary cooperation.52
Planning for effective response and recovery efforts without knowing what kinds 
and quantities of resources will be available, and when they will arrive, is difficult to say 
 
51 Chris Suter (Assistant  Chief, San Ramon Valley Fire) interview with author, Danville, CA, May 4, 
2005.     
52EMAC, http://www.emacweb.org/EMAC/About_Emac/About_Emac.cfm [Accessed May 10, 2005]. 
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the least. Local jurisdictions blindly count upon the state and, through the state, the 
federal government to provide whatever is needed. In an era of growing federal deficits, 
budget tightening at the state and local levels, and increasing demand for finite resources 
that dependency may prove disastrous. 
E. PRE-EVENT INCIDENTS 
1. September 29th-30th
A series of thunderstorms are blamed for several forest fires in southern and 
eastern Oregon, eastern Washington and western Idaho. Washington has sufficient 
emergency response capabilities to initially handle the fires, but Oregon and Idaho lack 
large resource pools. Both states request support through the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact as well as aid from the federal government.  
California agrees to send some of its small air tankers to southern Oregon, and 
fire agencies in the far north end of the state collectively provide additional assistance, 
but the state declines to commit major resources due to high fire danger conditions in 
both Northern and Southern California.  
Arizona, Nevada and Utah have relatively small resource pools, but send what is 
available. The federal government dispatches all of the fire fighting helicopters stationed 
in the affected states plus a majority of those stationed in the surrounding region. It also 
dispatches several fire fighting crews.  
2. October 1st
Most of the smaller fires are quickly controlled, but two major fires in 
Washington; three in Oregon and 2 in Idaho are still not contained. Fire officials predict 
3-4 more days before they are likely to gain control. 
3. October 1st—Southern California 
Several suspicious fires occur in the Southern California counties of Santa 
Barbara, Ventura and Los Angeles. A total of five fires are reported in the Tehachapi and 
Coastal mountain ranges. Fearing a repeat of the devastation caused by wild land fires 
during 2004, regional resources are quickly deployed and a request for mutual aid is sent 
to the State Office of Emergency Services. Orange County responds, but none of the 
other major southern counties are willing to commit resources because of concerns for 
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their own areas. This includes neighboring counties of San Bernardino, Riverside and San 
Diego that suffered extensive damage during the 2004 fires.  
To the north, only a few large population areas have sufficient resources to 
provide significant levels of aid. The San Francisco Bay Area—the largest of those 
population centers—is facing high fire danger as well. Consequently, most local agencies 
decline to provide aid. Contra Costa and Alameda decline to send assistance. 
Arizona, Nevada and Utah have already committed to the fires in the Pacific 
Northwest. Federal authorities deploy most of the remaining helicopters in the region as 
well as several fire fighting teams. The entire western United States is virtually stripped 
of federal fire fighting resources. Although additional resources can be brought in from 
the eastern part of the country, doing so would take a significant amount of time and 
would strip East Coast resources.  
California attempts to activate National Guard units within the state, but there are 
almost no air resources currently available. The only remaining Air Guard helicopter unit 
not deployed overseas is a squadron of Chinooks stationed in Modesto in Central 
California. These are immediately deployed south to provide vertical lift capabilities.   
Also almost entirely deployed are military police, engineer and transportation 
units. There are approximately 300 Guard members trained in fighting wild land fires left 
in the state. These are immediately activated and ordered to Southern California.  
4. October 2nd
One of the fires in Ventura County and one in Santa Barbara County are merging 
in an area of steep canyons that cannot be easily accessed by vehicles. The area is also 
very dangerous for ground crews, limiting response to aerial water and retardant drops by 
helicopters and the handful of small air tankers operated by the state.  
An urgent request for vertical lift resources to carry personnel and equipment into 
the area goes mostly unanswered. This kind of resource is almost exclusively operated by 
the military. In the entire western region of the country—from Montana west—there are 
fewer than forty helicopters available through the Guard. With the exception of the 
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Chinooks from Modesto, the others have already been deployed to the Pacific Northwest. 
No regular military units are available.  
By afternoon, the fires in southern Oregon and western Idaho are all at least 50% 
contained, but two of the Washington fires continue to spread.  Federal and out-of-state 
crews are deployed from Oregon and Idaho to Washington, but travel time and needed 
rest will make them unavailable for at least twenty-four hours.  
The Southern California fires continue to spread. Large-scale evacuations of the 
hills around Santa Barbara and the Thousand Oaks area in Ventura County are ordered. 
Remaining Guard units are activated to set up shelters when it becomes evident the extent 
of evacuations will overwhelm Red Cross resources. Unfortunately, the Guard has 
diminished shelter capabilities.53
Local law enforcement agencies request aid for security and evacuation 
assistance. The last large National Guard military police unit in the state, the 49th Military 
Police Brigade, recently began an eighteen-month deployment, leaving no trained 
personnel left to assist. The state sends 3,000 Highway Patrol officers to assist. Northern 
California regions are not asked to participate in the mutual aid response.  
Area hospitals are inundated with victims mostly suffering from minor injuries 
and smoke-related respiratory problems. Four of the state’s Disaster Medical Assistance 
Teams (DMAT’s) are activated and deployed around the fringes of the fires to provide 
medical relief. None of the teams is capable of performing major surgery, but each can 
provide immediate emergency care.54
F. THE INCIDENT 
1. October 3rd, 7:56 a.m. 
Commute traffic is at a peak in the Bay Area when an earthquake measuring 8.2 
on the Richter scale strikes along the entire length of the Hayward fault.  
 
53 Terry Edinboro (Chief of Operations—MSCA, Joint Operations Command, CA ANG) interview 
with author, Sacramento, CA. May 24, 2005 
54 DMAT Teams are comprised of volunteer medical personnel from local jurisdictions. There are 
eight teams in California that are prepared to respond within twelve hours. Each team is composed of 
thirty-five individuals. The teams are supplied with sufficient tents, food and medical supplies to last 72 
hours.  
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The initial quake lasts 1 minute, four seconds. Within twenty-four hours, 
hundreds of after shocks are recorded including two that measure 6.4 and 6.9 
respectively. The quake causes major damage that will take weeks to fully assess, but one 
significant event occurs in the Union Pacific service yard on the western edge of 
Martinez.  
2. October 3rd, 8:45 a.m. 
In the northern section of the city of Martinez, four men are living in a small 
rental near the police station. The four are members of a small group of al Qaeda 
sympathizers. They moved to Martinez following 9/11 after identifying Central Contra 
Costa as a prime target area for key infrastructure components. Over the past two years, 
they have examined numerous targets and have identified over a dozen that are readily 
accessible and easily disrupted by small explosive devices.  
The group has examined each location, photographed and studied it, and 
developed plans on how best to destroy it or at least maximize damage. Several of their 
photo operations have been noticed and reported to police, but the group’s members have 
managed to leave before police can arrive to investigate.55
The group quickly recognizes the confusion and disruption caused by the 
earthquake as a prime opportunity to attack one of their pre-selected targets. They select 
the pipeline at the north end of town for their first strike. The pipeline is chosen for 
several reasons: 
• It is close. It can be reached by bicycle in a few minutes. This is critical 
because many of the other sites the group has investigated would be 
difficult to reach because of road closures caused by the earthquake.  
• It is accessible. The pipeline runs exposed in several places as it runs 
through a Union Pacific yard and borders on a regional park where 
bicyclists, joggers and hikers are a regular part of the landscape.  
• There is absolutely no security. It is open to the public without protection 
of any kind. 
• Chances for escape are excellent. The group can plant bombs and be well 
on the way back to their house before they detonate. 
 
55 There have been several reports of suspicious activities including individuals taking photographs of 
petrol-chemical plants, bridges and oil pipelines in Contra Costa County during the last two years.  
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Two members of the group leave the house. Each carries a small device in a 
backpack that was pre-assembled weeks before. One device contains high explosives in a 
shaped charge. It is designed to rip the pipe open. The second device is an incendiary 
bomb, designed to ignite the gasoline. Both have timing devices. 
The group hopes the explosion and subsequent fire will carry over to surrounding 
buildings and cargo in the rail yard. They will succeed beyond their wildest dreams. 
The men ride bikes from their house to a nearby entrance to the regional park. 
They then ride through the park on a path that leads to the railroad yard. They have 
selected the location because it is easy to get to but masked from nearby homes and 
commercial buildings. The bombs are quickly placed on the pipe and the timers set.  
The men are not suicide bombers. They want to ensure their own safety, but they 
also wish to minimize the amount of time the bombs will be subject to discovery. They 
determine that three minutes will give them ample time to be out of the area while 
presenting only a small window for possible discovery. Three minutes later, at 9:08 a.m., 
the bombs explode. 
The effect is better than expected. The gas and fumes gushing from the pipe 
explode in a huge fireball that ignites nearby vegetation at the foot of the hill bordering 
the yard. The fire quickly spreads through a small adjacent canyon as well.  
Pushed by dry northeast winds gusting to 30mph, the flames quickly climb the 
slope toward the crown of the hill. The winds also push the flames to the east and west 
along the face of the slope. Within fifteen minutes of the explosion, flames traveling 
along the eastern slope reach apartments and homes at the western edge of Martinez. 
G. RESPONSES/DAMAGE 
Long-standing operational plans are automatically activated following the initial 
earthquake. Area Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) are fully staffed including the 
regional EOC’s in Oakland for Alameda County and Martinez for Contra Costa County. 
Emergency response agencies begin to compile a list of priority calls in their respective 
areas. State and local public works agencies deploy to assess road, bridge and building 
damage. 
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The 9-1-1 emergency phone system is overwhelmed. The handful of Public Safety 
Answering Points (PSAPs) in the region that are responsible for receiving 9-1-1 calls are 
staffed for normal operations. The amount of calls quickly places them in a crisis mode. 
9-1-1 calls go unanswered or callers are placed on hold. To keep critical lines open, the 
phone company resorts to an emergency number priority dialing system that delays the 
dial tone in most residences and businesses for 2-5 minutes. The average citizen is not 
aware of the delayed tone. Consequently, most individuals that attempt to use a telephone 
construe the silence as a sign of a dead phone. 
The combined impact on the phone system results in no report about the Martinez 
fire reaching the Contra Costa Fire District for 15 minutes. Responding units arrive 
within approximately 21 minutes. By then, the winds have continued driving the fire 
southward along the eastern slope. Several buildings are burning and the fire is minutes 
away from dense housing on the slope just north of the Contra Costa Regional Medical 
Center and Alhambra High School. On-scene units call for additional help. The Contra 
Costa units responding from Martinez cannot see the far western edge of the fire. They 
cannot project its path or the current fire edge in that direction, but they assume the worst, 
asking dispatch to alert West County fire agencies.  
There is no immediate evidence the explosion was intentional. Firefighters 
initially assume it is accidental. The location is not considered to be or treated as a crime 
scene.  
Following the earthquake, Contra Costa’s microwave system remains operable, as 
do most emergency radio systems. Alameda’s system is also operable, but both cell and 
landline telephone systems make communications difficult. 
Damage assessments begin trickling in, but it will be hours before a fairly 
complete picture is formed, and days before the real extent of damage is known. Some of 
the more critical damage is sustained by hospitals in western Alameda and Contra Costa 
counties. Nearly every hospital in this narrow corridor is built on or near the fault. Most 
are housed in older buildings that have not been retrofitted to current seismic safety 
standards. An estimated 60% of all beds in Alameda and 15 % in Contra Costa are lost as 
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hospitals sustain major damage. Although seven of Contra Costa’s eight full emergency 
centers survive the initial quake, only one in Alameda fairs as well.  
Logistics and transportation are also hit hard. All three major airports are built on 
fill subject to liquefaction. All three suffer major runway damage, closing them to 
everything but vertical lift traffic. Livermore and Byron—two small airports—remain 
open. Buchanan loses its tower, but its runways are relatively intact. However, the 
combination of the lost tower and smoke from the spreading Oakland Hills fire force it to 
shut down.  
Two of the three east-west highways through the Oakland Hills are shut down. 
Highway 4 from Martinez to Hercules is shut through Franklin Canyon due to numerous 
slides and road buckling. The adjacent surface road is also shut due to the same slides, 
and the parallel railroad tracks sustain major damage. Highway 24, connecting Highway 
680 to Oakland, is shut due to tunnel collapses, slides and major buckling in the Lafayette 
area. Only Highway 580, connecting east and west Alameda through Dublin and 
Hayward remains open through the Oakland Hills. To the east, the highway is closed at 
the Altamont Pass between Livermore and Tracy due to slides. 
In far eastern Contra Costa, several Delta levees have been breached, flooding a 
number of islands, including heavily populated Bethel Island, washing out railroad tracks 
and flooding Highway 4.  
Cal-Trans quickly examines and declares most major area bridges or their 
approaches damaged, closing all but the Carquinez Bridge connecting Vallejo with 
Western Contra Costa County via Highway 80. Although the bridge itself remains open, 
the approaches on the Contra Costa side are closed due to slides, buckling and a fire at a 
refinery in Rodeo adjacent to the highway.  
Making Highway 80 even more impassable, flooding from a dam collapse has 
damaged the highway, cutting West Contra Costa in half. The San Pablo Reservoir, an 
earthen dam, had been declared seismically unsafe in 2004. As a result, the dam has been 
kept at 60% capacity until repairs are completed. It was felt that, with the lower water 
levels, the dam could withstand a major earthquake. Unfortunately, Briones Reservoir, a 
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concrete dam located in the hills above San Pablo Reservoir did not hold. Briones burst, 
sending its water into San Pablo Reservoir, breaching the lower dam. Everything 
downstream, from El Sobrante to the Bay, and from North Richmond to the Hilltop Mall 
at the Richmond-San Pablo border is ravaged by the floodwaters.  
1. October 3rd, 10:00 a.m. 
The fire has crested the hills where the low shrubs and tall grass provide fuel as it 
drives south toward heavily timbered areas. On the west slope, the flames have reached 
the first dwellings—the small enclave of Port Costa. Fire crews are able to force the fire 
around the town, but the fire continues westward toward Crockett.  
In Contra Costa, the fire has already ignited dozens of older homes on the steep 
slopes. It is rapidly approaching the Regional Medical Center and Alhambra High 
School. Fire officials have requested help from San Ramon Valley Fire, but the two 
districts only have a total of one hundred fifty firefighters on duty, and additional fires 
and rescue needs compete for personnel and equipment. A request for mutual aid is sent 
to the California Office of Emergency Services via the regional mutual aid coordinator in 
Oakland. 
Agencies to the immediate east and south are too involved in fire and rescue 
operations of their own to provide aid. Major population areas further east including 
Sacramento, Stockton and Modesto are asked to provide assistance. Aid is organized 
quickly, but with so many road closures, getting to the scene will be difficult and slow.  
The state quickly assesses available assets. There are almost no immediate 
military resources available. Both Army and Air Guard units have been activated where 
available. Neighboring states have nothing left that is not committed elsewhere. Federal 
fire fighting equipment and manpower is also committed. Helicopters can be brought in 
from central and eastern portions of the country, but given flight time and crew rest 
requirements, they will not be available for three-to-four days.56  
 
56 Scott Daly (Commander, Field Operations, Contra Costa Office of the Sheriff) interview with 
author, Martinez, CA.  May 18, 2005. 
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Military and FEMA cargo planes are available to transport manpower, equipment 
and supplies, but the combination of airport and ground transportation disruptions makes 
it highly unlikely that significant aid can reach the impacted area for several days.  
2. October 3rd, 10:30 a.m. 
FEMA identifies a forward command center at Travis Air Force Base in Fairfield, 
but the base is on the north side of the Sacramento River, leaving no way to effectively 
deliver aid to the region. The lack of vertical lift capabilities further exacerbates this 
situation. 
Contra Costa Fire is forced to call for an evacuation of the hospital and high 
school, as well as residents and businesses on the west side of Alhambra Avenue in 
Martinez. Ironically, this includes the house used by the terrorists.  
There is no evacuation plan for the hospital, and transportation needed to relocate 
the patients has not been identified. John Muir-Mt. Diablo Hospitals and Kaiser 
Hospital—all in Central Contra Costa—prepare to accept patients from Regional, but 
only a handful of ambulances are available.  
School buses are eventually located to assist with the relocation and a clear 
transportation corridor to other area hospitals is identified, but securing transportation and 
loading all patients will take hours. The fire is less than an hour away. Hospital staff 
begins moving individual patients to streets across Alhambra Avenue.  
Area fire and police agencies are having considerable problems in their own 
jurisdictions. Outside agencies are finding it difficult to reach the affected area. California 
has limited fire crews and equipment in the area. There are no National Guard units in the 
affected area—all are deployed elsewhere, and little else left throughout California.  
3. October 3rd, Noon 
The state deploys seventy fifteen-man inmate fire crews, mostly from across 
northern and central California (the remaining 180 crews are already deployed in the 
south). It also commits what few air tankers it has remaining in reserve. With no Guard 
helicopters available, only a handful of water platforms can be quickly located. Although 
helicopters are preferred by fire officials when they can be obtained in adequate numbers 
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and can maintain a round-trip dumping time of four minutes or less, the small number 
immediately available come nowhere close to the amount required.57
Federal agencies determine that, given flight time and the need to rest the crews, 
additional helicopters from the federal fleet cannot be put into service in the Bay Area for 
3-4 days. By then, the major damage will have been done. 
On the west, hampered by the flooding, road closures and competing needs, 
firefighters are losing ground to the fire. Calls for heavy equipment are mainly 
unanswered except by local contractors that can be contacted. Cal-Trans deploys the 
equipment it has, but much has been dispatched to the south and several other pieces 
must be deployed to work on opening key roads. The Guard has no engineering or 
transportation units available. Air lifting in heavy equipment or personnel is not 
immediately possible due to a lack of usable airport runways and no vertical lift craft. 
4. October 3rd, 2:00 p.m. 
Combined efforts by both West and Central Contra Costa fire crews to create 
firebreaks across the hills are unsuccessful due to both a lack of manpower and air 
transport. Getting ample personnel and equipment into the affected areas in time proves 
to be impossible. Contra Costa and San Ramon Fire Departments conclude they do not 
have the resources necessary to stop the fire from continuing to spread south.  
Fire crews are able to contain the fire on the west side of Alhambra Avenue in 
Martinez even after it jumps Highway 4, but they are not able to stop it from reaching 
hillside homes, forcing thousands to flee. By mid-afternoon, an evacuation has been 
initiated for the entire area west of Alhambra/Pleasant Hill Road to Highway 24, 
including all of the Lafayette, Moraga and Orinda areas. South of Highway 24, 
evacuations are ordered for everyone west of Danville/San Ramon Valley Roads.  
In western Contra Costa and Alameda counties, fire agencies take a stand at 
Highway 80 south to Highway 24, and at Highway 13 south of that point to 580.  
 
57 Chris Suter (Assistant Chief, San Ramon Valley Fire) interview with author, Danville, CA, May 4, 
2005. 
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Police agencies are unable to provide adequate manpower to effect an orderly 
evacuation on either side of the hills. Without historical Guard resources, there is no way 
to get either fire fighting or security forces into the area quickly. Evacuations become 
routs as fleeing residents clog the few streets open.  
The Red Cross is overwhelmed. Area shelter locations are quickly identified, but 
there are no supplies, medical assistance or aid personnel authorities can get to the sites, 
and getting shelter information to the thousands being displaced presents a huge problem. 
The same is true for all incoming assistance—it can’t reach those most in need 
and the continuing spread of the fire keeps the situation highly volatile.  
5. October 3rd, 4:00 p.m. 
As the fires in the Pacific Northwest are contained, outside crews and equipment 
are redeployed to the Bay Area where the need is considerably greater. DMAT units from 
across the country are also deployed, but the need is for beds and operating capabilities 
and the teams, like everyone else, can’t readily get to those most in need of assistance. 
FEMA deploys its emergency response teams to aid in search and recovery efforts, and 
they too are blocked far short of the most affected area. 
Off-duty fire, law enforcement and emergency medical personnel that were 
counted on to provide relief do not appear. Two main reasons for this emerge during 
post-event analysis. The first is that, as most agencies had known for many years, a large 
percentage of their personnel live out of the area where the cost-of-living is much lower. 
This group could not get to their area of assigned responsibilities due to the road, bridge 
and rail closures. Another major reason was that emergency workers—especially ones 
with young children—were not willing to leave their families. As a result, on-duty 
personnel at the time of the earthquake remained the only staffing available for most area 
agencies during the first forty-eight hours.   
After the first twenty-four hours, the safety and effectiveness of emergency 
response personnel is seriously in question. Agencies are forced to cut their available 
forces in half to provide much-needed rest.  
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6. October 3rd, 8:00 p.m. 
The fire has passed Buchanan Field allowing officials to declare it available for 
relief efforts, but the lack of a tower and relatively short runway force authorities to wait 
for daylight to begin transporting in relief manpower, equipment and supplies.  
7. October 4th, Daybreak 
Relief efforts begin as Buchanan Field is opened. Cargo planes begin to land and 
unload, but a lack of space limits the number of aircraft on the ground at any one time, 
and a lack of fuel requires planes to take extra time to refuel at Sacramento and Stockton 
airports. 
8. October 4th, 10:00 p.m. 
Oakland Hills fire has driven through the Lafayette-Moraga-Orinda area and is 
heading for Alamo-Danville in the central county area. On the west side of the hills, it has 
raged through Berkeley and the North Oakland hills overnight. It is nearing Castro Valley 
where Highway 580 should act as a southern barrier. All available manpower and 
equipment is deployed to that area in a maximum effort to stop the fire from traveling 
further south. Santa Clara fire units have managed to get through to the area as well. As 
additional crews and equipment land at Buchanan, they are also sent south to Highway 
580 and to the western edges of Danville and San Ramon in hopes of halting the further 
destruction of buildings in those areas. 
9. October 5th, 1:00 a.m. 
The Oakland Hills fire is declared contained on the south at Highway 580. On the 
east, it was kept above the building line in San Ramon and most of Danville. On the west, 
the fire still burns through parts of the hillside and into the flatlands adjoining the 
Highway 80/880 corridor. 
As relief crews replace exhausted fire, police and medical rescue units, the effort 
quickly turns from response to recovery. FEMA and numerous other search and rescue 
teams from throughout the country respond. There is still a huge lack of adequate shelter, 
and medical assistance remains inadequate. 
FEMA begins organizing additional medical relief teams, but there is a 
tremendous lack of facilities. The Guard transferred all field hospital resources to the 
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Army Reserves several years ago. All regular and reserve military medical units are 
deployed overseas, leaving mo military resources available. 
Aid workers begin manning emergency centers as long-term shelter operations 
commence. Initial recovery efforts continue for several weeks. Long-term recovery will 
take years. 
H. AFTER ACTION REPORTS 
During post-event critiques, several facts were identified and generally agreed 
upon: 
• Initial damage from the earthquake included approximately 25,000 
fatalities and 80,000 serious injuries. Approximately 200,000 dwellings 
and 40,000 other buildings were destroyed or damaged to the point of not 
being habitable.  
• The Oakland Hills fire and subsequent evacuations caused 4,000 fatalities 
and over 20,000 serious injuries. The fire also destroyed another 35,000 
buildings. 
• One million people are left without shelter in Alameda and Contra Costa. 
Total damage estimates are expected to reach several billions of dollars.  
• The inability to provide significant aid within the first twenty-four hours 
caused an estimated 15,000 additional fatalities and several thousand more 
injuries. These latter figures are attributed to four primary causes: limited 
back-up resources available within the affected area, especially 
manpower; geographical isolation caused by a combination of road, rail 
and airport closures; multiple events occurring in the same part of the 
country, spreading resources out more than usual; and the lack of a 
substantial response capability within the state. 
The most critical deficiency was considered to be the almost total lack of National 
Guard resources available—something the state had heavily depended upon for the last 
sixty years. Once a force of twenty thousand, the California National Guard had been 
reduced to less than 2,000 trained and available troops.  
Air resources, in particular vertical lift aircraft, had been deployed overseas, 
leaving the area without alternatives. Engineering units that could have been used to clear 
roadways and re-open runways were also missing. Little remained, in the form of either 
manpower or equipment, to establish and man aid stations and emergency shelters. No 
security forces were available to aid law enforcement agencies in securing damaged areas 
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or to respond to numerous riots that broke out in the following days. Fire and other rescue 
personnel had little military help in search and rescue operations, and limited aid from 
other emergency response agencies for the first two days. 
The Guard, once considered one of the most critical manpower and equipment 
resources in the state, has become a non-entity and no alternative resource has been found 
or identified. The void created by this situation directly attributed to thousands of deaths 
and the destruction of billions of dollars worth of property.  
I. SCENARIO CONCLUSIONS 
Even the most valid scenario is written to lead the reader to some determined 
point of view. This incident is no exception. It was designed to demonstrate just how 
important the loss of immediate military assistance during a major event could be. But 
designing for a single effect is not necessarily invalid.  
In this scenario, events that have occurred—the Oakland Hills fire and explosion 
involving a high-pressure gas pipeline—were combined with one that is extremely likely 
to occur—a major earthquake on the Hayward fault. Even the timing and weather follow 
historical events—both the 1989 Oakland Hills fire and the Loma Prieta quake (the last 
large Bay Area earthquake) took place in October.  
The enormous amount of damage to the transportation infrastructure in the 
scenario is well within the parameters thought likely by planning experts. The kind and 
level of local resources, if anything, was overplayed. In a real incident of this kind, the 
sheer amount of work put on emergency responders would be overwhelming. It is likely, 
for example, that only a fraction of available firefighters would be dedicated to fighting 
the Oakland Hills fire. Most would be devoted to search and rescue operations.58
The lack of outside resources that would be immediately available was accurately 
portrayed. Even without the fires in Southern California, Washington, Oregon and 
Idaho—a combination of events that has been experienced more than once in recent 
history—there would not be adequate assistance available within the first few hours to 
 
58 Chris Suter (Assistant  Chief, San Ramon Valley Fire) interview with author, Danville, CA, May 4, 
2005. 
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contain the fire. There is a real inadequacy in portable hospital capabilities and a true lack 
of available Guardsmen in most states. Most important of all, there is an absolute lack of 
resources that could be brought to bear in such a case during the first twenty-four hours. 
That period was agreed upon by the subject matter experts from local jurisdictions as the 
most critical in determining the success of response and rescue operations versus turning 
efforts into recovery. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Post-9/11 era is marked by many new challenges never before experienced in 
our history. It has lead to a broadening U.S. military presence throughout the world for 
combat, security and relief missions.  
This build-up of overseas missions arrived after years of military downsizing. Just 
maintaining the present manpower needs in Iraq and Iran has created substantial backlash 
for the military. Active duty units have had their tours of duty extended, individual 
soldiers due for release have been forced to stay, call-ups of Individual Ready Reserves 
have taken place for the first time in decades, and talk of returning to an involuntary draft 
system has stirred substantial debate. 
To meet immediate personnel needs, the military has thrown in National Guard 
and Reserve units. According to the military’s own estimates, Guard and Reserve units 
now comprise about 40% of all troops stationed in Iraq and Iran, and that number is 
predicted to rise as additional units rotate back. 
Although use of the National Guard for overseas combat missions is not a new 
phenomenon, the level of present commitment exceeds any experienced since World War 
II, and it comes at a very critical time. 
National Guard deployment for homeland security is also experiencing a 
heightened level of need. In addition to its traditional roles in support of civil authorities 
during and following major disasters, the Guard has been tasked with new missions as 
well. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, thousands of Guardsmen were deployed to 
secure domestic military bases. More thousands provided critical infrastructure protection 
for airports, bridges and other key locations. Air National Guard units have been, and 
continue to be, deployed for combat air patrols over major cities.  
The combined effect of the dual roles on the Guard is becoming more evident 
with each passing month. It is simply being stretched beyond its ability to maintain high 
mission levels in all areas of responsibility. Its current commitments, which are not likely 
to decrease in the near future, will soon become mutually unsustainable. Given the 
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military’s primary role in defense of the United States—a philosophy clearly held by the 
Department of Defense—the need to use Guard units overseas will almost certainly 
increase and will overshadow its domestic security roles. This trend has already 
manifested itself in several easily recognized ways. 
Dual role responsibilities are causing National Guard recruitment efforts to run 
well below goals for the first time in many years. High personnel tempo rates have 
resulted in a decrease in the number of Guardsmen that extend their Guard contracts, and 
it has lead to a parallel decrease in recruitment of active duty personnel for Guard 
duties—which has traditionally counted for nearly half of all new Guard sign-ups. 
Training for primary specialties has been jeopardized because of domestic 
mission levels, and combat readiness has been similarly affected, increasing the length of 
time it is taking to prepare activated Guard units for overseas deployment. 
Guard equipment is being used at a rate that significantly increases maintenance 
costs and reduces its anticipated life expectancy. Estimates by Guard command staff 
suggests a need for an additional $ 20 billion to replace this rapidly aging equipment at a 
time marked by increasing national deficits and expanding costs to maintain overseas 
operations. 
With expanded use of the Guard for overseas deployment, a loss of availability 
for domestic missions has followed. States are beginning to recognize this trend. 
Governor’s are expressing concern over the percentage of Guard personnel activated and 
the loss of key equipment used to fight fires, provide security, transport personnel and 
supplies to disaster areas, and assist with other response and recovery missions.  
In some instances, Guard resources can be replaced by other federal assistance but 
for many needs, there is no available alternative. This is the crux of the problem. Civil 
authorities have come to depend upon Guard resources during major incidents and for 
assistance in post-event management and recovery. As military needs continue to use 
ever-increasing amounts of Guard capabilities for homeland defense priorities, fewer of 
those resources will be available to states and local jurisdictions. 
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Although warning signs are becoming evident, and key individuals—including 
Guard and Reserve commands and governors—are starting to understand the possible 
consequences, there is still no effort to systematically approach this problem on the 
federal level. For the most part, local jurisdictions seem to simply ignore the warning 
signs as well.  
At some point it is likely that, without proper planning, emergency managers and 
responders will be confronted with a significant and irreplaceable loss of resources 
needed to contain, control and recover form a major event. When that happens, officials 
at all levels of government will be forced to deal with the issue. It seems more efficient, 
and certainly more logical, to address the problems now, before they become Draconian.  
This paper does not provide a complete answer to that question—that is an 
entirely separate and complex project of its own—but some general observations and 
suggestions can certainly be included. 
A. RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM 
Planners routinely consider possible losses of communications systems, access to 
affected areas due to road failures, loss of water and power and other contingencies when 
creating strategic response plans. The potential loss of military support represents just 
one more contingency planning area—albeit a very critical one. NEMA and similar 
organizations need to bring this issue to the forefront of critical incident management 
discussions. 
B. DEVELOP DEPENDABLE ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES 
EMAC is an excellent beginning to a multiple state, trans-national aid system that 
relies on first responders helping first responders. Its major drawback is that, like most 
mutual aid pacts, it remains voluntary. Although this format has worked in early 
examples such as the recent devastation caused by hurricanes Ivan, Frances and Charley, 
some long-term dependability needs to be brought into the equation. In addition, there 
was still a major dependence on military assistance.  
C. INCREASE VOLUNTEER RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING 
There are thousands of first responders throughout the country than can be called 
upon to assist with a local problem through EMAC and similar agreements. There are 
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millions of potential citizen volunteers as well. Two models that deserve consideration 
are the DHS Citizen Corps and the Law Enforcement Volunteer program (LEVOLS) 
developed by the Salt Lake Organizing Committee for the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
The Citizen Corps, which is modeled along the lines of  previous Civil Defense 
volunteer efforts, develops and trains local community groups to aid in times of disaster. 
Information on this program is readily available on the Citizen Corps Website.59
The Utah LEVOLS depended upon professional law enforcement personnel from 
several states agreeing to volunteer for security duties during the Olympics. This 
approach is promising, but at least two pitfalls are readily identified.60
The first is dependence upon first responders to volunteer their time. For a high 
profile venue, such as the Olympics, that have a high personal appeal among first 
responders, such an approach might work, but attempting to use this type of resource 
across the all hazards spectrum is problematic.  
The second is dependence upon  these same workers to perform work for free 
than might otherwise be considered part of his/her regular paid duties. Based on recent 
court decisions, this might represent a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. If 
challenged, this would stop a California officer, for example, from performing any kind 
of volunteer work within the state, including anything that s/he might do through a 
statewide mutual aid agreement. 
This has not been a problem in interstate events because a first responder could 
not normally be expected to provide out-of-state services as part of their regular paid 
duties, but the development of EMAC may quickly change that particular exemption.  
D. STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
This strategy calls for the development of national training and certification 
requirements for first responders. Such a universal approach would strengthen and 
support EMAC and other mutual aid programs by standardizing first responder 
capabilities. 
 
59 Citizen Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/index.shtm [Accessed February 15, 2005]. 
60 The Olympic After Action Report (unpublished. Report, December 2002), n.a. 
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The danger in this approach is that it amounts to a federalization of local 
responders most likely achieved through the persuasive power of federal purse strings. 
Taking such an approach assumes federal authorities are experts in emergency response 
requirements—a dangerous assumption—and is certain to face extremely stiff resistance 
from states and local jurisdictions. On the other hand, developed properly and in 
partnership with state and local authorities, the effort could produce a much more 
consistent responder cadre. 61
E. DEVELOP AN ALL-HAZARDS TRAINING AND TESTING AGENDA 
It is extremely unlikely that the scenario presented in this paper could currently be 
used as the basis for a regional exercise, even though it would arguably provide 
invaluable data about the area’s collective ability to respond to and mitigate casualties 
and damage following a major event. The priority placed on terrorist events by the 
federal government is one major reason why we aren’t likely to see such a training event. 
Even tabletop exercises can be costly and full-scale events involving field units 
are extremely expensive. They are also disruptive to regular operations. For these 
reasons, the number of training exercises is limited by both operational and budget 
considerations. Practically speaking, federal emphasis on terrorism has forced most 
jurisdictions to concentrate on exercises involving such acts because they can receive 
reimbursement.  
In fairness, another reason is that emergency planners tend to build exercises 
around single incidents rather than a chain of events. Such exercises are simply easier to 
conduct. What they don’t do is test for real response capabilities under truly adverse 
conditions, instead preferring exercise parameters that focus on individual kinds of 
events. A review of regional training exercises in Contra Costa County—home site of the 
scenario—supports this contention. Since 9/11, the region has conducted at least two 
exercises each year. These exercises, sponsored by federal grants, concentrated solely on 
terrorist acts. Not one single exercise in the past four years has focused on a natural 
disaster, and none have involved more than a single event. To truly understand system 
 
61 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 45. 
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capabilities, agencies should be tested for responses under extreme conditions, and 
exercises should be geared to review generic response capabilities, not incident-specific 
ones. 
F. CONDUCT A THOROUGH, SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF CURRENT 
AND FUTURE TRENDS AND INCIDENTS  
This would have to be a completely objective analysis conducted by a specially 
tasked group approach like that used in establishing the Gilmore Commission.62
These ideas represent starting points only. They are not presented as a cure-all for 
an emergency response system that is in serious peril due to a lack of comprehensive 
contingency planning, but they do provide a platform from which a more consistent and 
complete planning process can be created.  
The research presented in this paper points to a need; actually a series of needs 
that start with a more systematic approach to emergency response and recovery planning 
that is based upon an all hazards, all contingency model. It identifies an area of real, not 
just theoretical importance that can but has yet to be addressed.  
The scenario presented combinations of events that are collectively possible and 
individually probable. It also identifies specific resource needs that were once available 
from the National Guard. In many cases, those lost resources have not been replaced. 
Most critical of these is rapid (within the first twenty-four hours) access to air 
support—particularly vertical lift assets—manpower, engineering and transportation 
units, shelters and portable hospitals. For a combination of reasons, none of these 
resources is currently available. Even without the fires in Southern California, there 
would not be sufficient Guard units available in the state to provide much needed 




62 Official title: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, established pursuant to Section 1405 of the Strom Thurmond National 
Defense Authorization Act, 1999. 
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The severity of the problem is just now gaining some public recognition as states 
begin calling for a review of how National Guard resources are being used and what the 
associated impact on local communities is when these resources, once so heavily 
depended upon, dry up.  
The impact would be less critical if the current use of the Guard for homeland 
defense missions was short term. Unfortunately, all indications are that the problem will 
continue for some time and possibly even be exacerbated as the combined impacts on 
recruitment and retention, coupled by a growing federal deficit, are felt.  
It is imperative that these issues be brought before a public venue; that they be 
given the consideration they deserve and realistic, workable resolutions identified. The 
alternative is a continuing deterioration in homeland security precisely at a time when our 
country is threatened not only by historic kinds of incidents, but the very real possibility 
of major terrorist attacks as well. We have been fortunate not to experience a major 
terrorist attack since 9/11, but Hurricane Katrina certainly qualifies as an example of just 
how badly our response capabilities have deteriorated in the last few years, and the 
critical issues mentioned above are beginning to surface as a result.  
At the time of this paper’s publication, both emergency response and initial 
recovery efforts were still under way, making it far too early to reach any final 
conclusions about what went right or wrong in this catastrophe, but some preliminary 
observations are certainly in order. 
Local, state and federal authorities have been equally blamed in the media for 
major deficiencies in both preparation and response to the storm, particularly in the New 
Orleans area. Before the dust has even settled (literally), Michael Brown, Director of 
F.E.M.A. was first replaced in the field and then resigned. Michael Chertoff, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, has been harshly criticized and President Bush has publicly 
acknowledged a weak and delayed federal response, and has taken responsibility for it.  
One early editorial that may prove to be very close to the truth was the September 
19, 2005 article by Time Magazine—An American Tragedy: 4 Places Where the System 
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Broke Down.63 Time provided a fairly strong argument for spreading the blame among 
the mayor of New Orleans, governor of Louisiana, F.E.M.A. Director Michael Brown of 
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff. One of the most critical deficiencies 
will almost certainly be identified as a slow and relatively weak National Guard response. 
According to Time, four days after the hurricane struck Louisiana, Governor Blanco still 
only had a little over 13,000 National Guard soldiers under her command even though 
she had requested 40,000 troops, and to get even that many, 29 states had to activate and 
deploy units to Louisiana (page 39).  
Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp and Amy Belasco, three national defense 
specialists with the Congressional Research Service, wrote a more noteworthy early 
critique. Although meant as an initial review only, the report nevertheless outlines the 
major areas of concern that will likely be at the center of future reports. These include 
timeline of the response and possible types of failures (p. 13), command of the Guard and 
federalization of the evacuation questions (p. 14) and the impact of overseas deployment 
of Guard troops in terms of availability of both personnel and, of equal importance, 
equipment (p. 14). 64
The attention this event will focus on our readiness and ability to respond 
effectively to major disasters may bring the issues discussed in this paper, and other 
related matters, into the central political arena. It is unfortunate that it took such a 
colossal tragedy but, if it can be said that anything positive could possibly come out of 
Katrina, this incident may turn out to be the saving grace for our emergency preparedness 
system.  
 
63“An American Tragedy: 4 Places Where the System Broke Down,” Time (September 19, 2005): 35-
41, n.a. 
64 Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp and Amy Belasco. Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response 
(Washington D.C., Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, order code RL330950), 
September 19, 2005. 
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